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# MID-AMERICA

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### Britain and Direct Spanish American Trade, 1815-1925

The question of British trade, direct to and from Spanish America, was of vital significance both in the post-Napoleonic European politics and in the emancipation and recognition of the Spanish colonies. Yet this point has either received little direct attention or else been lost in the maze of broader topics. British demands for direct trade with the Spanish colonies, Spanish response and counter-proposals, and the development of British policy to conform to the ever-changing status of national interests and the revolutionary South American colonies form the basis of this study. The stake was high. Previous fruitless efforts to secure liberalization of Spanish monopolistic commercial regulations only tended to spur the British on to press their demands more vigorously. Thus the stage was set for an era of great decisions.

Before the guns of the Napoleonic wars were stilled forever, British and Spanish diplomats began anew to resolve the question of South American trade. This policy of Castlereagh, as early as 1812, was to effect a reconciliation between Spain and the restless, revolting South American colonies but only on certain conditions—giving the South Americans the full rights of Spanish subjects and, significantly, free commercial intercourse with all nations. In relation to the latter condition, Spain, as the parent state, was to enjoy commercial preference.<sup>1</sup> British interests in this matter were not entirely unselfish. Urged on by the pressing demands of the mercantile class, the British diplomats sought commercial concessions from the Spanish Government but with no tangible success.

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<sup>1</sup> A. W. Ward and G. P. Gooch, eds., *The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy 1783-1919*, New York, 1923, II, 14.

On January 26, 1815, Henry Wellesley, the British Ambassador to Spain, reported to Lord Castlereagh upon the state of negotiations between the two nations. He said British relations with Spain respecting South American commerce were in a very unpleasant condition. Moreover, due to poor communication between the various Spanish departments, it was difficult to obtain answer to any representations.<sup>2</sup> Relations between the two governments grew more strained when the Spanish Government announced its intention to send an expedition to South America to suppress all trade with foreign nations. In a letter dated February 28, 1815, Viscount Strangford was instructed to adopt the most effectual means of warning British subjects trading in the Rio Plata, without a license from the Spanish Government, to remove their ships and effects lest they suffer the consequences of the proposed blockade.<sup>3</sup> At this particular time the British Government did not manifest any staunch determination to protect commercial interests in the South American colonies.

British neutrality in the contest between Spain and her colonies was suggested by one group in Parliament. Certain members believed the British had violated this neutrality with the final result that the South American patriots complained and the Spaniards accused Britain of aiding in the destruction of the Spanish constitutional government.<sup>4</sup> In his speech, the Chancellor of the Exchequer emphasized the necessity of remaining neutral, although great commercial advantages would accrue to British mercantile interests if the colonies gained their freedom.<sup>5</sup>

The strict observance of neutrality was by no means the most predominant thought in the House of Commons. Mr. Whitbread stated that New Spain was treated unjustly by the mother country and he believed it was to the best interest of Great Britain to cultivate the friendship of the colonials.<sup>6</sup> Further example of official and mercantile interests, ignoring the protests of Spain, can be found in the discussions of the House of Commons, March 13, 1815, over the South Sea Company.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Charles Vane, Marquess of Londonderry, ed., *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh*, London, X, 246.

<sup>3</sup> C. K. Webster, ed., *Britain and the Independence of Latin America 1812-1830*, London, 1938, I, 95-96.

<sup>4</sup> *The Parliamentary Debates*, Published under the Superintendence of T. C. Hansard, London, XXX, 159-160, March 13, 1815.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, 160.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, 161.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 157-158.

The Spanish Government, however, displayed a willingness to discuss possible trade concessions to the British in return for mediating the dispute with her insurgent colonials. What was British reaction to the proposed mediation? On May 26, 1815, Wellesley wrote to D. Pedro Cevallos, Spanish Minister of State, and explained that the British king decided not to undertake any mediation until he was clearly informed of the principles upon which the Spanish Government proposed to enter into the negotiation.<sup>8</sup>

The Spanish position in the matter of mediation was partially divulged in a letter from Charles R. Vaughan to Castlereagh, November 16, 1815. Vaughn referred to a discussion with Cevallos concerning the desire of the Spanish Government to avail itself of British mediation for which Spain would concede to Britain a participation in South American trade. This concession, however, depended upon the successful completion of reuniting the colonies to Spain by any means within British power. Cevallos stressed it was absolutely necessary that any such concession had to be a reward for some special service in order to prevent other nations from demanding similar privileges.<sup>9</sup>

At one point in the discussion between Vaughan and Cevallos, the Spaniard suggested the British send ships, men, or even a loan of money to suppress the fire of revolution in South America. Vaughan refused to transmit such a proposal to England. He further told Castlereagh that Cevallos doubted the possibility of securing a written document stating the precise terms of the proposal, due to the intrigue which would develop. When informed that little weight could be attached to a conversation without an explicit proposal, Cevallos insisted the Spanish King authorized him to state that the trade of America would be opened to Britain as the price for successful mediation.<sup>10</sup> The reference to a written agreement stating the grant of commercial concessions in return for mediation is most significant. During the entire 1815 to 1825 period, the British constantly reminded the Spanish that these concessions had been granted, but they could not produce documentary proof. Apparently, the Spanish Government never conceded, in written form, the right of direct trade with the Spanish colonies. Why was the Spanish Government reluctant to do so?

In still another section of the November 16 letter, Vaughan

<sup>8</sup> Pedro Torres Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, Madrid, 1912, IV, 102-103.

<sup>9</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 341.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, 342.

mentioned having told Cevallos that the mutual interests of the two nations would be best served by a commercial concession for Britain to trade with the Spanish colonies upon just and equitable terms. Vaughan remarked that the present state of the Spanish Government made the problem of mediation even more difficult than before Ferdinand's return. He feared that if the deliberations regarding concessions were made in the Catholic King's councils there would be a great delay in British interference. Cevallos attempted to explain the want of sincerity on the part of Spain in these negotiations as being due to the prejudices held by the Spaniards about opening the colonial trade to the British.<sup>11</sup>

The letter discussed above also referred to a July 13, 1815, report of the Council of Indies to the King of Spain. The Council recommended to Ferdinand VII

to preside in the Council of his Ministers and to call upon them to examine the state of the relations between Spain and Great Britain, and to lose no time in conciliating the interests of the latter by an adjustment of all differences and a fair treaty of commerce, as, unless the trade to Spanish America is opened to Great Britain, the Colonies cannot be preserved to Spain; that every effort should be made to obtain the powerful influence of England for a reconciliation of the Colonies, which Spain cannot hope to bring about by her own means. . . .<sup>12</sup>

The above reportedly was signed by the whole Council and presented to the Spanish king. Vaughan used both this report and the conferences held with Cevallos to instruct Castlereagh that a material change in the disposition of the Spanish Government had taken place since the question of mediation was last discussed. The opening of trade was no longer entirely repugnant to the Spaniards who sensed the futility of suppressing the rebellious colonies by their own force. Vaughan advised that the offer of mediation be brought, without delay, before the British Government lest other foreign powers step in.<sup>13</sup>

On December 20, 1815, Castlereagh sent his answer to Vaughan's letter. He claimed it was difficult to get any official decision upon the Spanish proposals. One of the reasons advanced was that Britain would have to be certain Spain would pursue a liberal policy toward the South American colonies as one basis of her future supremacy over them. Castlereagh's letter disclaimed any desire for exclusive commercial advantages as this would destroy British influence.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 342-343.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, 344.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 344-345.

Furthermore, he added the British monarch himself always recommended that the commerce of South America be opened to all nations with moderate duties and with preferential treatment accorded to Spain herself.<sup>14</sup>

It is difficult to measure immediate Spanish reaction to British views, especially those expressed by Castlereagh. The conclusions of the Spanish Council of State during 1815 gave some indications as to how far the Spanish were willing to go in granting commercial concessions to Britain. First, in return for English mediation commercial privileges ought to be yielded. Secondly, it was necessary for the British to unite with Spain for the purpose of subjecting the rebellious colonies. If the mediation could not be effected by a specified period of time, the British should cut off commercial activities with the colonies. Moreover, any commerce with the insurgent Spanish colonies during the mediation period had to be carried on in designated ports.<sup>15</sup>

Abstinence from trade was farthest from the minds of many commercially-minded Britishers. One of the most anxious of these was Brougham, who in a speech on agricultural distress, April 9, 1816, advanced some important reasons for not relinquishing South American trade. Brougham believed that British connections with Spain might result in some arrangements to facilitate British commerce with the rich markets of Mexico, Brazil and Peru. He realized that presently a considerable trade was carried on with those areas but under trammels which rendered it precarious and most isksome. Since no British commercial or political consuls resided in these regions, the existing commerce took on the appearance of contraband trade. Even under these conditions, Brougham admitted, the trade was very beneficial to British mercantile interests and would prove doubly so if it became regular and authorized.<sup>16</sup>

In the meantime, negotiations with Spain remained unsuccessful. On May 9, 1816, Henry Wellesley wrote to the effect that only by working upon Spanish fears would it be possible to secure advantages. He thought Spain ungrateful since past British influence was exerted to promote objects of greater importance to Spain than to Britain. If the present situation was such that Spain was unable to maintain her control over the South American colonies, it was due to her own

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 346.

<sup>15</sup> Jerónimo Becker, *Historia de las Relaciones Exteriores de España Durante el siglo XIX*, Madrid, 1924, I, 488-489.

<sup>16</sup> *Speeches of Henry Brougham*, Edinburgh, 1838, I, 544-545.



deplorable system and her lack of confidence in the only power which invariably supported her interests.<sup>17</sup>

Wellesley's notation of May 29, 1816, evidenced further disharmony between the Spanish and British Governments. In a conversation with M. Pizarro, the Spanish Minister of State, Wellesley stated that the actions of the Spanish Minister of Finance in regard to British trade almost justified a declaration of war. In the least, it proved a serious impediment to amicable relations between Britain and Spain.<sup>18</sup> What the Minister of Finance was guilty of could not be ascertained. Judging by Wellesley's comment, its nature was serious.

While the British complained of Spanish reticence to grant direct trade, the Spaniards continued to urge mediation with trade as the reward. On July 5, 1816, the Spanish Ambassador in London, Count Fernan Núñez, wrote to Pedro Cevallos enclosing a letter from General Roche which outlined a plan for pacifying the Americas. He hoped Britain might accept this proposal.<sup>19</sup>

On October 17, 1816, Fernan Núñez wrote to Castlereagh regarding their conference of September 15, 1816. In this conference, Castlereagh intimated that Spain could no longer ensure the tranquil possession of her South American colonies without pardoning the rebels and opening colonial commerce to foreign trade. The exclusive commercial system adhered to so rigidly by Spain was both harmful to the colonials and opposed to the liberal views prevailing in Europe, Castlereagh told the Spanish representative. Fernan Núñez replied that exclusive commerce was advocated by Spanish mercantile interests which enriched themselves through it. This group apparently exercised great influence upon the Spanish monarchy. At the same time, the populace allowed itself to be misled about the advantages which accrued from exclusive trade. It was necessary, therefore, to proceed cautiously in reforming the present system, Fernan Núñez insisted. He also stated the Spanish Government had contemplated for some time the calculated risk of opposing the entrenched mercantile class.<sup>20</sup> Furthermore, Fernan Núñez claimed that the Spanish king was at a loss to comprehend the utility the British expected to derive from the open trade. British co-operation against the insurgents was a duty. The warfare, in turn,

<sup>17</sup> F. A. Wellesley, *The Diary and Correspondence of Henry Wellesley, First Lord Cowley 1790-1846*, London, 85.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>19</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, IV, 198.

<sup>20</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 347-348.

ravaged the South American colonies to the point where they no longer provided rich markets. Civil war also ruined the mines and decreased a much-needed metal which Britain used in her eastern commerce.<sup>21</sup>

Spanish governmental disputation centering around direct trade must be considered. On October 22, 1816, the President of the Council of Indies, Duke de Montemar, wrote to Cevallos about the pacification of American colonies and the existing system of commerce.<sup>22</sup> The very same day, Montemar again wrote to Cevallos in compliance with a secret royal order of September 7, 1816, upon the methods of pacifying South America as proposed by D. Miguel de Lastarria. The ideas of the Councillor D. Francisco Arango relative to commerce were also explained.<sup>23</sup> The proposals of Lastarria and Arango were discussed in a most confidential note to Cevallos together with José Pablo Valiente's suggestions regarding commerce.<sup>24</sup> On October 24, 1816, Miguel de la Bodega mentioned the pacification of South America and British mediation to achieve this purpose.<sup>25</sup>

In a private and confidential letter dated December 20, 1816, Castlereagh wrote to Wellesley about a reply to Fernán Núñez concerning commercial privileges in return for mediation. He turned down the Spanish suggestion of using British arms and added:

In 1812, they offered us exclusive commercial advantages if we would mediate. We declined exclusive advantages, but declared our willingness to mediate upon terms liberal between Spain and South America, including a commercial system somewhat similar to our own in the East Indies, which would leave to Old Spain a reasonable preference and give their American subjects the benefit of a qualified intercourse with other nations, in which we did not aim at more than our fair participation, declining however to make our Mediation an armed one. The Spanish Government of that day never absolutely rejected our terms, but never being in terms accepted, the Mediation fell to the ground. Whenever the subject has been since mentioned, which has been the case more than once in the shape of a new invitation to us to interfere, we have always desired, before we gave an answer, to know whether they admitted the basis on which we offered to mediate (so far as it was applicable to the existing state of things), or what basis they had to propose.<sup>26</sup>

The above excerpt bears further evidence that the Spanish had not presented the British with a written agreement granting direct

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 348.

<sup>22</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, IV, 226-227.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, 227.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*, 226.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 227-228.

<sup>26</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 350-351.



trade to the South American colonies prior to 1815 nor were the British willing to use force to subject the colonies to Spanish domination.

Madrid answered British protestations with further requests for mediation. The Spanish Government still entertained the idea of granting direct trade as a reward for British services in this issue.<sup>27</sup> On January 10, 1817, the Spanish Secretary of State, José García de León y Pizarro, wrote to Wellesley proposing mediation.<sup>28</sup> On February 8, 1817, British proposals were considered by the Council of Indies, and Montemar expressed his viewpoint regarding freedom of commerce.<sup>29</sup>

In the meantime, the Spanish Government became more apprehensive mainly due to British activities in South America. On May 27, 1817, Luis de Onís wrote to Pizarro about a plan formulated by the British for monopolizing Spanish American commerce—all under the cloak of pacification.<sup>30</sup> At this point, some doubt arose over the wisdom of employing the British as mediators. An anonymous report of a Spanish Councillor of State in part reflected this opinion. Dated July 1817, the report asked several questions: whether one principal means of maintaining Spanish domination over the colonies, once the revolutionary fires were extinguished, was freedom of commerce, and, if it was necessary to procure British mediation to subject the rebellious colonies.<sup>31</sup>

Spanish anxieties were not lessened by further British pressure for direct trade and the refusal to use arms to effect successful Spanish authority over the colonies. A Foreign Office memorandum, August 20, 1817, stressed the above two points. The confidential memorandum reiterated that Britain did not wish exclusive privileges in Spanish American ports.<sup>32</sup> A further memorandum dated August 28, 1817, ruled out the use of armed force in behalf of the Spanish Government.<sup>33</sup> More alarming was the representation from the Royal Company of the Philippines to Pizarro, September 20, 1817. Enclosed was a translation of an article inserted in the London *Courier* of September 5, 1817. The article contained an extract of a petition from the merchants in Jamaica to the British Government

<sup>27</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, IV, 225-226, Report of the Council of Indies, 1816.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 245.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 251.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 266.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, 284.

<sup>32</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 355-357.

<sup>33</sup> *Cambridge History*, II, 64-65.

for protecting the commerce which grew with South America.<sup>34</sup> On September 30, 1817, the Spanish Ambassador in London, Duke de San Carlos, wrote to Pizarro that illicit British assistance to the South American rebels had to be stopped since it presented an obstacle to successful conclusion of the mediation by European powers.<sup>35</sup>

Spanish attempts to secure European intervention in subduing the insurgent colonies irked British feelings, especially those of the Duke of Wellington. In a letter to Wellesley, October 26, 1817, Wellington referred to a note written by Fernán Núñez which the Spaniard intended to circulate to all but the British Ambassador. Wellington saw the note in confidence and referred to it as an absurd paper likely to prevent the British Government from entering into the mediation. If he were the British Minister, Wellington said, he would decline to interfere in any way in the scheme of pacification. Furthermore, Wellington pointed out numerous representations. First of all, the Spaniards claimed Britain offered mediation unsolicited to which Wellington countered by saying it was forced upon Britain by Spanish intrigues at the conference in Paris. Secondly, the Spanish accused British officers of assisting South American insurgents. Thirdly, the Núñez paper objected to opening colonial trade. It was Wellington's opinion that despite the kindness accorded to Núñez in Britain, he was still the most determined enemy the country had—at least as far as was in his power to be.<sup>36</sup> Perhaps Spanish accusations of illicit aid to the colonials resulted in the passage of a proclamation on November 27, 1817, prohibiting British subjects from taking part in the contest between Spain and her colonies.<sup>37</sup>

On December 10, 1817, San Carlos wrote to Castlereagh and stressed the point that all European commercial interests suffered if these insurgent colonies were not restored to the legitimate monarch.<sup>38</sup> Eighteen days later, Henry Wellesley complained to the Spanish Minister of State about the intended blockade which would extend to the ports of Chili, Peru, the Orinoco, Guayra and the island of Margarita and was designed to curb the revolts. He

<sup>34</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, IV, 298.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 303-304.

<sup>36</sup> Duke of Wellington, ed., *Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshall Arthur Duke of Wellington*, London, XII, 115-116.

<sup>37</sup> *British and Foreign State Papers*, compiled by the Librarian and Keeper of the Papers, Foreign Office, London, 1830, 1816-1817, 488.

<sup>38</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 361.

stated its legality depended upon the effectiveness of the blockade.<sup>39</sup> According to various contemporary opinions, Spanish blockades were ineffective and, therefore, illegal. Such a concept certainly worked to British advantage.

Despite marked disagreement between Spain, negotiations continued at a fairly normal pace. On both March 4, and March 5, 1818, San Carlos wrote to Pizarro and discussed British views regarding the mediation.<sup>40</sup> On March 23, 1818, San Carlos was instructed to discuss cleverly the question of mercantile concessions in return for mediation.<sup>41</sup> The next day, the British Government replied to San Carlos.<sup>42</sup> On official letter to San Carlos, April 6, 1818, advised him to inform Castlereagh of the prevailing Spanish disposition in regard to commercial privileges providing Spain obtained definite encouragement on the subject of mediation.<sup>43</sup> On April 21, 1818, San Carlos reported to Pizarro the results of a conference with Castlereagh.<sup>44</sup>

The uncertain state of commerce in South America elicited much concern in Spain. Knowledge of British trade only aggravated an already unpleasant situation. On May 4, 1818, the Secretary of Finance, D. Rafael Morant, made some observations upon the possibility of free commerce with the Americas in which he included a financial statement of the deplorable state of that commerce.<sup>45</sup>

British commercial activities added to the disquieting Spanish-South American relations. An act passed by Parliament, May 23, 1818, contributed towards the further disruption of peaceful mother country-colony commercial arrangements. Part of the act stated:

that it shall and may be lawful to import Tobacco, Rice, Grain, Peas, Beans, and Flour, into any of His Majesty's Colonies or Plantations in the West Indies, or on the Continent of South America, for the supply of the Inhabitants thereof in British-built Ships owned, registered, and navigated according to Law, from any Colony or Possession in the West Indies, or on the Continent of America, under the dominion of any Foreign *European* Sovereign or State.<sup>46</sup>

While the above referred solely to importation of certain commodities, British trade to South America embraced exportation of numer-

<sup>39</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, IV, 335.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*, 358.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, 366-367.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 367.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, 370-371.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, 373-374.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 377.

<sup>46</sup> *British State Papers*, 1817-1818, 735.

ous British goods to these colonies to the utter distress of Spain. At times, the flow of British products to South America was quite large and resulted in glutted markets.<sup>47</sup>

British commercial involvement in South America did not terminate Spanish negotiations. On June 2, 1818, San Carlos wrote to Pizarro regarding a conference with Castlereagh and Wellington for further negotiations on the subject of pacifying the South American colonies.<sup>48</sup> This very same day, San Carlos wrote another letter to Pizarro and informed him of ultimate British intentions regarding mediation and the demonstrated indifference of the British Government.<sup>49</sup>

On June 13, 1818, San Carlos gave Pizarro an account of the proximate number of expeditions which sailed from English ports in favor of the American insurgents.<sup>50</sup> Similar letters found their way to the Spanish Government during the entire 1815 to 1825 period.

By the middle of 1818, the Spanish Government decided once more to lay its colonial problem before the allied European powers. The following points were agreed upon as the core of the proposed discussion. The first granted amnesty to the insurgents at the time of submission. The second equal consideration to the native Americans with respect to employment and honors. The third provided for an arrangement of colonial mercantile relations with foreign powers upon principles in keeping with the new political situation of those colonies and of Europe. Lastly, the Spanish king proposed to adopt measures suggested by his allies which were compatible with his dignity and rights.<sup>51</sup> The reaction to this proposal could not be evaluated.

The Council of Indies on August 22, 1818, deliberated the wisdom of opening the commerce of the Isthmus of Panama to friends and neutrals.<sup>52</sup> Ten days later, San Carlos wrote to Pizarro about two conferences with Castlereagh regarding the oft-discussed subject of mediation. At these meetings, Castlereagh informed San Carlos that if the rebellious provinces insisted upon their independence, the British under no circumstances or pretext would employ arms to persuade them to accept Spanish domination.<sup>53</sup> Since the

<sup>47</sup> Jean Baptiste Say, "Letters to Mr. Malthus on various subjects of Political Economy particularly on the causes of the general stagnation of commerce," translated for *The Pamphleteer*, XVIII, London, 1821, 295.

<sup>48</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, IV, 382.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.*, 382-383.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*, 385.

<sup>51</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 369, June 18, 1818.

<sup>52</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, IV, 401.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 406.

Spanish thought along the lines of forced submission, they probably were unwilling to concede commercial advantages under any other proposal. Perhaps they realized the present state of the colonies was such that only armed force could bring about submission.

In the November 9, 1818, letter to Castlereagh, the Earl of Liverpool criticized the attitude of the new Spanish minister. According to Liverpool's letter, this minister proposed that the commerce of Britain, along with that of other foreign powers, be carried on only through Spanish ports. This, of course, revived the colonial monopoly system so repugnant to British mercantile interests. Liverpool then differentiated between the trade going to the colonies presently independent from the mother country, which Spain was hardly able to reconquer, and those in which the Spanish still exercised some control. Mediation would probably be beneficial only in the case of the latter.<sup>54</sup>

The Spanish still thought in terms of mediation as late as the end of 1818. On November 15, 1818, Morant referred to the consultation of the Council of Indies of August 22, 1818, relative to the state of foreign commerce in Panama. He mentioned that one of the principle points treated in discussions concerning the pacification of the Americas was that of free commerce for foreign nations.<sup>55</sup> In spite of Spain's willingness to grant concessions, Castlereagh was doubtful whether the Spanish Government would accept mediation. Castlereagh, in a letter to Liverpool, November 26, 1818, suggested that Wellington should be sent to Madrid to negotiate with the Spaniards.<sup>56</sup> Wellesley's report to Castlereagh, December 21, 1818, evidenced the unfriendly spirit towards the British Ambassador and his proposals mentioned in various other reports. Constant British demands for free commerce with Spanish colonies coupled with the manner in which these were presented proved embarrassing to Wellesley.<sup>57</sup>

On January 5, 1819, the Council of Cádiz inquired of the Spanish Secretary of State whether the Spanish king had prepared any measures dealing with South American commerce which were pending deliberation in the Council of State.<sup>58</sup> British interests experienced a revitalization at this time. The persistent manner in which they pressed their demands for free trade caused the other foreign Euro-

<sup>54</sup> Wellington, *Supplementary Despatches*, XII, 823.

<sup>55</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, IV, 416-417.

<sup>56</sup> Castlereagh, *Memoirs*, XII, 90-91.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.*, 94-95.

<sup>58</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, IV, 424-425.



pean powers to look suspiciously in their direction. One of the powers deeply concerned in the Anglo-Spanish controversy was Russia.<sup>59</sup>

British insistence that neutrality was maintained failed to convince the European powers and especially the watchful Spaniard. To prevent further foreign intervention in behalf of the insurgents, the Spanish king issued a declaration on January 14, 1819. This declaration provided means for punishing foreigners who traded with the colonials over Spanish protests. Castlereagh spoke with San Carlos relative to the above declaration and explained British sentiments on the issue. He agreed with the main principle and commented that Britain would not feel impelled to interpose in behalf of its subjects who aided the insurgents either in a civil or military capacity.<sup>60</sup> However, as Castlereagh's letter to Henry Wellesley, March 12, 1819, clearly stated, there were certain conditions under which the British would not tolerate maritime interference. In the first case, British citizens engaged in purely commercial activity in South America could not be subject to the Spanish proclamation. The second case to which the British took exception dealt with British ships carrying arms and munitions to the rebellious provinces. While Castlereagh admitted Spanish jurisdiction in capturing and condemning vessels which transgressed the rules of neutrality, and the orders of their own government, he could not acquiesce in the infliction of personal severity upon the crew of these vessels. Castlereagh insisted this distinction applied to all vessels under the British flag whether found on the high seas or "accidentally" within any of the South American ports. Wellesley was told to inform M. Casa Irujo of these principles so that instructions might be given to Spanish authorities abroad as a precautionary measure against any possible misunderstanding.<sup>61</sup>

Further evidence showing the state of the British mind on this subject can be found in George Canning's May 18, 1819, speech in Parliament. Characterized by obvious pro-South American sympathies, the speech emphasized British neutrality and willingness to mediate—on its own terms. Canning condemned the contraband munitions trade with insurgents and stressed amicable relations with the Spanish colonies as the wisest course. Competition in an open market, not exclusive trade privileges was the British goal.<sup>62</sup> One

<sup>59</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 376-377.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, 379-380.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 380.

<sup>62</sup> R. Therry, ed., *The Speeches of the Right Honourable George Canning*, London, 1828, IV, 127-129, *passim*.

of the significant points of the above speech was the admission of the illegality of a trade in arms and munitions. No stigma was placed upon other commercial activities.

However strong the pro-South American sympathies might be, the British Government realized something should be done about the number of British citizens taking military part in the rebel cause. Spain's complaints could not go unheeded. The result was the proposal of a Foreign Enlistment Bill which precipitated much discussion in Parliament and midst mercantile groups. On June 3, 1819, the Bill was debated with great stress upon the British commercial interests in the Americas. Sir Robert Wilson spoke in behalf of the merchants, manufacturers and shipowners of London who objected to the Bill. Subscribed by 1,700 London "people of trade," the petition of this group looked at the proposed measure as grievously injurious to British mercantile interests.<sup>63</sup> The speeches of Messrs. Denman and Douglas echoed similar fears.<sup>64</sup> However, Canning favored the Bill saying that lawless bands of armed men raised for foreign service did not serve the interest of Great Britain nor safeguard her South American trade.<sup>65</sup> In the debate on June 21, 1819, Robert Grant spoke for the passage of the Bill on the basis that British commercial interests should not interfere with justice.<sup>66</sup> Lord Nugent argued against the Bill and challenged Spain's word to institute a more liberal commercial policy.<sup>67</sup> However, the Bill was passed. Discussion in the House of Lords found its members divided pro and con. In the June 28, 1819, debates, the Earl of Westmorland sanctioned the Bill as a stimulant to British trade.<sup>68</sup> The Marquess of Lansdowne was of another opinion. He believed no obstacle should be placed in the way of South American trade.<sup>69</sup>

The Foreign Enlistment Bill having been sanctioned by Parliament, attention was focused upon more pressing matters. On September 24, 1819, Castlereagh wrote a letter to Lord Stewart in which he looked with disdain upon Spanish efforts to repossess the revolted colonies by means of an expedition. If the Spaniards proved successful, Castlereagh added, it meant the re-establishment of an ancient monopolistic colonial system. Even though mediation failed

<sup>63</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, XL, 859-860.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.*, 880-889.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, 1108-1110.

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.*, 1254.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*, 1259.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 1398.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, 1405.



to become a reality, he still hoped Spain might base future colonial policy upon the liberal terms suggested by her allies.

In a commercial sense this Government feels less solicitude upon this question than is generally supposed; in some way or other, the wants of South America will be supplied; that supply must come from Europe, and this country will in some mode or other furnish its full share of this supply; but they look with regret and alarm to the decision, and especially for the best interests of Spain herself, not merely as forcing commerce into pernicious channels of a contraband intercourse to the great prejudice of her true financial policy, but as laying the seeds of future discontent and successive insurrections throughout South America.<sup>70</sup>

There is a note of defiance in Castlereagh's letter. Apparently, British mercantile thought had developed to the extent that direct trade with the Spanish colonies would be carried on contrary to Spanish wishes. What is even more interesting is that such a high official as Castlereagh should express himself in this fashion. As time progressed, the British not only decided to trade despite Spanish protests but also "logically" proved the legality of their conduct. The growth of this concept is evident in various portions in this study.

The Spanish Government was well aware of British sentiments and such knowledge tended to create disharmony in the negotiations between the two countries. On June 6, 1820, Wellesley reported to Castlereagh that the Duke of San Fernando complained about the frequency of his discussions upon commercial topics. Otherwise, Wellesley said, San Fernando was desirous of doing everything within his power to conciliate relationships.<sup>71</sup> Wellesley's comparative success in dealing with the Spaniards at this time was not indicative of previous misunderstanding. For example, on March 13, 1820, Wellesley informed Castlereagh that his house had been the proposed object of a mob riot which failed to materialize.<sup>72</sup>

Outspoken favoritism toward the Spanish colonies in Parliament, e.g., Lansdowne's pro-colonial speech on May 26, 1820, could not but help to add more fuel to the fire.<sup>73</sup> To dispel any fears, Castlereagh instructed Wellesley in a letter dated June 2, 1820, to repel the calumnies which circulated in regard to his personal conduct and British opinions.<sup>74</sup> The effectiveness of Wellesley's claims certainly must have been nullified by news of Cochrane's naval

<sup>70</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 6.

<sup>71</sup> Castlereagh, *Memoirs*, XII, 171.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, 221.

<sup>73</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, Second Series, 1820, I, 563-564.

<sup>74</sup> Castlereagh, *Memoirs*, XII, 269.

activities in South American waters. On September 26, 1820, Rafael Gravier del Valle wrote to the Minister of Ultramar. He discussed the state of Spanish commerce with America, the damage done by Cochrane and the necessity of protecting the commerce with Spanish ships of war.<sup>75</sup> For example, on August 9, 13, 20, 31, September 1, 16, 19, 1820, the Spanish Cortes debated the question of the revolting colonies and the important issue of trade. Discussion centered around the problem of contraband trade, protection of Spanish commerce, foreign interference and solutions to this pressing issue.<sup>76</sup> Similar debates were held on October 24, November 5, and November 8, 1820.<sup>77</sup>

The general outlook on British South American trade was very bright during the last month of 1821. A flourishing trade existed despite various blockades and Spanish complaints of illegality. Hall's journals of his voyages to South America bore out the value of the new markets. On December 9, 1821, Hall wrote that the shops of Lima were filled with British manufactured goods; merchants of all nations carried on their business; all this to the exclusion of the "indolent" Spaniards.<sup>78</sup>

How would the British Government justify the existence of this rich commerce? As previously mentioned, the concept surrounding the legality of this trade expanded over the period of years covered by this study. It grew to suit the commercial needs of the English nation. On December 8, 1821, a Foreign Office memorandum introduced a further justification for the trade. Spain's earlier assistance to the revolting North American colonies was used to show that present British activities were not innovations in respect to questions involving illegal trade. Moreover, commercial recognition need not disturb the peace between Great Britain and Spain.<sup>79</sup> This opinion became more widespread as recent patriot victories in Mexico, Peru and Columbia bespoke stability. Castlereagh's letter to Sir Charles Bagot, December 14, 1821, commented in this manner.<sup>80</sup>

In the face of the existing trade, the British officials still insisted

<sup>75</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, V, 82.

<sup>76</sup> *Diario de las Actas y Discusiones de las Cortes*, Legislatura de los años de 1820 y 1821, Madrid, 1820, II, 244-245, 344-356, III, 194, IV, 171-192, 214, VI, no. 3, 7-25, no. 7, 2-11.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.*, X, no. 4, 17-44, XI, no. 6, 29-42, no. 13, 26-32.

<sup>78</sup> Captain Basil Hall, *Hall's Voyages*, Extracts from a Journal written on the Coasts of Chili, Peru and Mexico in the years 1820, 1821, 1822, Edinburgh, 1826, II, 51.

<sup>79</sup> Edward J. Stapleton, ed., *Some Official Correspondence of George Canning*, London, 1887, I, 96-97.

<sup>80</sup> Castlereagh, *Memoirs*, XII, 443.

neutrality was maintained. In a State of the Nation report in 1822, British conduct was examined with the purpose of showing the positive applications of that neutrality. It was admitted this British moderation was severely tried since it was torn between a sense of duty and justice as against personal gain. South American markets offered rich fields for British commerce and the merchants realized Spanish impotence to prevent the trade. Despite the tauntings of mercantile pressure groups and political opposition, the British Government deemed it a national honor, the report explained, to preserve the status of a neutral.<sup>81</sup> Emphasis was placed upon lack of armed assistance to either party as the criterion for judging honor and justice. Commercial activity was glossed over while the claim was advanced that mercantile interests did not guide national policy.

At this point, a brief study of mercantile pressure groups concerning South American trade is necessary for better evaluation of official British policy. On May 9, 1822, the Liverpool Shipowners' Association petitioned the Lords of the Privy Council to improve the commercial relations between Britain and the former Spanish colonies.<sup>82</sup> In a memorial of June 1822, the Liverpool merchants quoted the amount of European goods consumed annually by the colonials at £13,000,000. Such a trade deserved the attention of the British Government. Furthermore, the memorial pointed out that during the period from 1820 to May of 1822 no less than 155 vessels cleared British ports for Buenos Aires, Chile, Peru and Mexico.<sup>83</sup>

On July 20, 1822, John Lowe, merchant, wrote one of his several letters upon the importance of recognizing the South American colonies. Lowe referred to the unpleasant situation in which British trade found itself at the present time due to the uncertain measures adopted by the government. He then stressed the intense interest on the part of British manufacturers and merchants in securing more favorable conditions in the South American trade.<sup>84</sup> These unfavorable circumstances were tolerated for a time but now that a possibility of direct trade existed, these merchants and manufacturers looked with great interest and satisfaction toward an increased demand in ever-expanding markets. They believed it was no longer necessary to ship to expensive intermediary ports. Lowe referred to the

<sup>81</sup> "The State of the Nation at the Commencement of the Year 1822," *The Pamphleteer*, London, 1822, XX, 42-44 *passim*.

<sup>82</sup> Leonard Axel Lawson, *The Relation of British Policy to the Declaration of the Monroe Doctrine*, New York, 1922, 88.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*, 89.

stability which characterized some former Spanish colonies—a stability which promised security in commercial dealings. It was necessary for the British Government to accept the new order of things and act accordingly. Moreover, Spanish commercial regulations did not reflect any of the liberality which would encourage the British Government to hope for better trade relations with that country.<sup>85</sup> Lowe's views reflected the opinion of many traders who favored recognition of the revolted colonies. Hyslop and Company belonged in the above category.<sup>86</sup> The London merchants also took an interest in the great potential of South American markets. A petition dated September 14, 1822, to the Board of Admiralty, demanded better protection for vessels trading to South America by urging a convoy.<sup>87</sup>

In the meantime, British negotiations with the Spanish Government continued along very unsatisfactory lines. Castlereagh's letter to Luis de Onís, June 28, 1822, insisted that neutrality was maintained and denied all rumors concerning exclusive trade privileges.<sup>88</sup> British protests did not quell Spanish apprehensions. Therefore, the Spaniards attempted to solve the colonial commercial problem without the benefit of England's mediation and without any rewarding concessions. On August 3, 1822, the Council of State deliberated upon the June 28, 1822, decree of the Cortes relative to negotiation with the dissident overseas governments in respect to provisional commercial conventions.<sup>89</sup> The following day, a royal order was sent to the political heads of Ultramar regarding the authority of the commissioners in approving the provisional treaties of commerce with the dissidents.<sup>90</sup>

While the Spaniards contemplated a solution to their maritime problem, the British prepared to initiate a new system of trade with the insurgent Spanish colonies. Wellington's letter to Canning, September 21, 1822, referred to a conversation with Monsieur de Villèle upon the following subject. Wellington stated:

I explained to him the relation in which we stood towards those Colonies in a political point of view, as considering them Governments *de facto*, and recognizing their belligerent rights as Powers at war, and in a commercial point of view, in carrying on trade with them for many years under the

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, 478–481 *passim*.

<sup>86</sup> Duke of Wellington, ed., *Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur Duke of Wellington*, London, 1867, I, 307.

<sup>87</sup> Lawson, *British Policy*, 87.

<sup>88</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 387–388.

<sup>89</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, V, 451.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.*, 453.



British flag. I then explained the alteration in the commercial relation which had taken place in the last Session of Parliament, and the probability that His Majesty's Government might deem it expedient to send persons to those Colonies to transmit reports on which we could rely of the real estate of their relation with the Mother Country, and on which we might found our ulterior measures with respect to them.<sup>91</sup>

This left little doubt as to what the British Government contemplated doing in the near future—despatching commercial consuls to the Spanish colonies. It is further important to note the rather frank admission of a trade with the colonies labelled as illegal by the Spaniards but considered legitimate by the British mercantile interest.

Spanish obstinacy in granting direct trade concessions and the possibility of armed European intervention on the eve of the Congress of Verona, forced Castlereagh to modify his views in respect to the South American issue. In a set of instructions, which he did not live to carry out, he laid out a policy later followed by Canning. Written for his own use and then transferred to Wellington before he proceeded to Verona, Castlereagh made the following observations. He said that if the independent Spanish colonies could maintain themselves despite Spanish attempts to resubjugate them, other powers would recognize them sooner or later. Therefore, Spain should arrange a method of intercourse where she cannot re-establish dominion. Castlereagh differentiated between colonies where a contest still existed; where the struggle was terminated in patriot favor; and where negotiations were still carried on with Spain. With regard to the first and third points Castlereagh said it was unwise to grant recognition. However, with regard to the second point, the British deemed their position justifiable in the recognition of *de facto* governments. Once more Castlereagh admitted the extent of the trade carried on with the Spanish colonies and the impossibility of checking it at this stage of development without great economic burden. He then mentioned the change of policy formulated by Parliament in the form of a relaxation of the Navigation Act. Castlereagh thought British *de facto* recognition entirely in accord with the existing law of nations and enunciated British policy to confine itself solely to this type of recognition for the present time. When formal recognition would be granted was a debatable question.<sup>92</sup>

The modified Navigation Act referred to above owed its passage

<sup>91</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 73.

<sup>92</sup> G. R. Gleig, *History of the Life of Arthur Duke of Wellington*, translated from the French of M. Brialmont, London, 1860, IV, 375-376.

to a decline in the export trade and the desire to promote further commerce with South America. Part iii of the Act permitted direct British importation of foreign goods from all areas which formerly belonged or still were under Spanish domination in ships belonging to those countries.<sup>93</sup>

The commercially-minded British underestimated Spanish determination to suppress what they termed illegal trade. The result was a series of maritime depredations both by the official Spanish navy and irresponsible pirates infesting South American waters. These depredations offended British dignity and forced the adoption of protective measures. On October 15, 1822, Canning wrote to Wellington about the extensive system of piracy and condemnation of two British ships by Spanish authorities on grounds of trading with insurgent colonies. Canning said the British suffered equally from Spain's claim of sovereignty and from the violation of this sovereignty by her lawless subjects. Because England refused to interfere in Spain's domestic problems, it did not necessarily follow that she abandoned her rights to vindicate the depredations.<sup>94</sup> Canning regretted that Spain was unable to suppress the piracy herself and justified British position for taking care of this matter in whatever manner they saw fit. At this point in the study, another factor becomes evident. The British no longer only claimed the legality of South American trade but they furthermore intended to protect it forcibly if necessary. Judging by the tone of Canning's letter, any redress of grievances from Spain herself was uncertain. Thus politely but firmly the Spanish Government was informed of British intentions.

The subject of piracy and Spanish confiscations formed the basis of Canning's letter to William A'Court, British representative at Madrid, October 18, 1822. The letter referred to the capture of the *Lord Collingwood* by the Spanish privateer *Panchita* and its subsequent condemnation in December 1821. Apparently, the owner of the vessel contacted Castlereagh who in turn instructed Mr. Hervey in Spain to insist upon the gross illegality of the above condemnation. Hervey presented a note to the Spanish Secretary of State and received a promise of inquiry into the matter. Based upon the inquiry, on July 16, the Spanish Government pledged to take action "conformable to justice." Hervey again protested to the Spanish Secretary of State about the delay and was informed that no solution had been reached. Canning then informed Court that he was

<sup>93</sup> Alexander Brady, *William Huskisson and Liberal Reform*, London, 1928, 90.

<sup>94</sup> Wellington, *Despatches*, I, 357.

to pursue the topic from where Hervey left off and to renew the remonstrances against the outrageous case of illegal capture and condemnation. Canning referred to the extensive archives containing similar grievances either justified or palliated by Spanish officials. However, in no instance was any redress accorded to British claims. The time came for the British to require atonement for the confiscations, particularly in the case of the *Lord Collingwood*, Canning insisted. By referring specifically to the above case, Canning did not mean to infer that commercial oppression during the last six years was to go unnoticed.<sup>95</sup> A summary of the remainder of Canning's instructions is necessary due to the significant pronouncements that it contains. The specific ground on which this vessel was confiscated was the commercial activity it carried on with vessels belonging to Buenos Aires. Canning claimed that Spanish authority in this portion of South America had long ceased to be of consequence. Moreover,

it has been distinctly and solemnly declared by England, and admitted by Spain, that if England forebore to prejudge the question of a possible amicable settlement between Spain and her ancient colonies, by acknowledging the independent separate existence of the latter, she did so, in the complete understanding and on the condition distinctly admitted by Spain, that her trade with those colonies should be free and unmolested: nay, that Spain should not, even upon the resumption of her authority (if ever she should be able to resume it) resort to the reestablishment of her exclusive system or, if at all, at least not without previous warning, and an equitable allowance of time for the winding up of British commercial concerns.<sup>96</sup>

Whether any such agreement between the two nations existed is unknown. No evidence was found by the writer to substantiate the claim as far as the Spanish Government was concerned. Its validity is based solely upon British interpretation. If Spain persisted in condemning vessels carrying on colonial trade, Canning mentioned two avenues open to the British Government. One would be to acquiesce in Spanish pretensions and the other to legalize the trade by publicly recognizing the Spanish American governments. It was noted the British preferred to follow the latter course. Since unredressed grievances could not be suffered indefinitely, Canning indicated the king's decision to issue orders to the Board of Admiralty to adopt the best measures for protecting British interests. The commander of the Cuba squadron was delegated the responsibility of sweeping the South American waters free of pirates—with or without

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.*, 377-378.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.*, 378.



the consent and assistance of the Governor of Havana. The magnitude of the piratical injustice, Canning argued, necessitated such action despite a recognized violation of Spanish authority. If the Spanish king admitted the existence of such a necessity it would be most agreeable to the British. Court was especially warned to assure the Spanish minister that there was no intimation of hostility or unfriendliness meant by the British decision to protect its maritime activities. Canning then stated that the British king had no desire to interfere in the domestic concerns of Spain.<sup>97</sup> Such a statement, in view of British activity in South America, is open to question. In conclusion, the October 18 letter to Court warned the Spanish that if British commercial interests were injured without some redress, recognition might be decided upon as the best mode to prevent future depredations. If Spain continued to leave unchecked the piratical activities complained of for such a long time, her complacency forfeited her right to complain about the resulting recognition.<sup>98</sup>

On October 29, 1822, Canning wrote to Wellington that persistent efforts to secure redress went unheard. Instead of becoming more liberal, each successive Spanish Government imposed more of the old monopolistic system upon British interests. Once again Canning stated that an agreement existed whereby Spain would not consider British trade with the colonies a breach of obligation. He further insisted England adhered to her neutral position and in return was visited with new confiscations and condemnations. Spanish reluctance to indemnify the British and prevent further violations justified British recognition.<sup>99</sup> Mention was then made to a memorandum drawn up by Robinson, at the Board of Trade, sketching such commercial engagements as would be advisable if recognition was accorded to the South American colonies.<sup>100</sup> The whole tone of Canning's letter was such as to imply recognition as an event in the not too distant future. Thus another step in British policy was reached. The British now contemplated recognition as a means to give further security to their commercial enterprise. Spain still refused to grant direct trade. The British determined otherwise.

The memorandum referred to in Canning's letter, and as discussed above, shed further light on British intentions. A question was raised whether in negotiating recognition with the Spanish colonies effort

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.*, 378-379.

<sup>98</sup> *Ibid.*, 380.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.*, 463-464.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.*, 466.

should be made to obtain any exclusive or specific commercial advantages as a condition for recognition. The memorandum denied the justice and political wisdom of such action. Such a procedure would destroy the impression given by the British that they did not wish for exclusive trade privileges and thereby arouse the animosity of other interested powers. Moreover, the colonials themselves might not consent to any such agreement.<sup>101</sup>

British determination to employ a naval force to protect commerce became a matter of serious concern at Madrid. Under pressure, the Spanish ministry promised to grant satisfaction for the ships which had been captured and to withdraw prohibitions against British trade with the Americas.<sup>102</sup> Canning doubted Spanish intentions and unswervingly adhered to his policy of sending consular agents to protect British interests. He dictated a memorandum for the Cabinet, November 15, 1822, supposedly justifying the necessity for sending commercial or civil agents with that purpose in mind. The safeguarding of British rights of self-defense positively required the residence of such agents at the principal ports of each of the South American states. Secondly, British merchants clamored for such protection. Furthermore,

The overbearing arrogance of Spain no longer acquiesces in our neutrality. Our ships are seized and confiscated, not because they violate blockade or have enemy's goods on board, but simply because they trade with the Colonies. The tacit compact which subsisted for years by which Spain was to forbear from interrupting our trade, in compensation for our forbearance to recognize her Colonies, is now forgotten or renounced by Spain, and the old Colonial system is revived in as full vigour as if she had still a practical hold over her Colonies, and had a navy to enforce her pretensions.<sup>103</sup>

The use of the phrase "tacit compact" is important since it proved to be one of the foundations of British claims to trade with the colonies. From this point on to recognition in 1825, the British insisted that the Spaniards had granted the right to trade in an unwritten gentleman's agreement but were never able to produce evidence to substantiate their claims. The Spanish denied the existence of any such agreement.

In another section of the November 19 memorandum, Canning stated that the only course open to do away with all pretext for Spanish enforcement of obsolete monopolistic pretensions was recognition. He doubted whether the Spanish Government could ever

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*, 467.

<sup>102</sup> Lawson, *British Policy*, 98.

<sup>103</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 394-396.

regain her jurisdiction in the independent states. Since there were considerable British interests in Peru, merchants demanded some type of superintendence. He further claimed the Spanish Government had complete knowledge of British plans through Onís and was, therefore, prepared to receive the final decisions.<sup>104</sup>

Canning issued another memorandum on Spanish colonial issues dated November 24, 1822. Further reference was made to the unwritten agreement with Spain over commercial privileges. A brief history of British representations to the Spanish Government was also included. Suggestions regarding mediation and pacification received minute attention. However, he argued, the rapid progress of events in the New World was such that British policy must conform to the welfare of the country.<sup>105</sup>

Once British policy was decided upon, it had to be justified in the eyes of the legitimacy-minded European powers. Wellington's role at Verona paved the way, to a certain extent, for what was to follow in 1823 and 1825. Writing Metternich on December 1, 1822, Wellington indicated that the Spanish Government proposed to discuss measures for reconciling the two nations but there was no mention of a treaty of commerce. If a treaty of commerce had been proposed by the Cortes, it certainly would be directed at reconciling Britain to crisis-plagued Spain.<sup>106</sup>

While Canning played with the possibility of some type of recognition for the independent Spanish colonies, his positive efforts were directed toward the establishment of commercial agents with a consular character at the various ports in which British subjects carried on commercial activity. On December 9, 1822, Canning informed Court of the urgency of such a step. He resolved to take no further action toward a political recognition thus giving Spain an opportunity to consent to such a move. Canning's explanation was that British forbearance would aid negotiations in behalf of the colonials and incline Spain to seek British mediation with France, which at this time weighed heavily upon Spanish brows.<sup>107</sup>

Little if no documentation is available regarding the Spanish reaction to British policy as enunciated during 1822. There was no indication that the Spanish Government agreed with the British interpretation of the "tacit compact" theory. Proof exists that efforts were made to alleviate some of the colonial complaints in respect

<sup>104</sup> *Ibid.*, 394-396.

<sup>105</sup> *Ibid.*, 76-77.

<sup>106</sup> Wellington, *Despatches*, I, 622-623.

<sup>107</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 401.

to commerce. A December 14, 1822, confidential note to D. José Gorossarri discussed the methods to be adopted for the pacification of the American provinces with an eye to the economic situation.<sup>108</sup>

Although Court previously informed San Miguel that no decided step was taken to nominate consuls or commercial agents to South American ports, Canning's letter to Court dated December 28, 1822, contradicted that view. Canning enclosed an extract of a communication from the Board of Trade listing the ports and places to which it was necessary to send agents of some description to look after the welfare of British trade. Even if Britain maintained friendlier relations with Spain, Canning reiterated, it would be difficult to acknowledge a title which no longer could be enforced.<sup>109</sup>

M. de San Miguel has himself confessed... what, indeed, is abundantly evident, that it is utterly hopeless for the Mother Country to look to the practical re-establishment of that exclusive system, which still exists in her law with respect to her late possessions in America. He has the candour to admit that the time is come when Spain, instead of dreaming of bringing back the practice to the law, must, so far as relates to her maritime jurisdiction on the American coast, conform her law to the necessity which defeats her practice; and, if this be true with respect to the coast which her flag has still the power of visiting, imagination can hardly suggest a course of measures by which she could ever hope to recover her authority over the interior of those immense countries, so as to clear them of the foreign commercial establishments, which have grown up there during the period while those Provinces have been achieving their Independence.<sup>110</sup>

Court was instructed to inform San Miguel of the contents of the enclosed papers relative to the appointment of consular agents. Moreover, Court was to suggest to San Miguel that Spanish governmental approbation of this step would be highly satisfactory prior to the appointment of the above-mentioned agents.<sup>111</sup> The preceding letter revealed certain important items. It showed the attitude of one Spanish official in regard to Spain's colonial future. Secondly, it evidenced a degree of concern, small as it was, for Spanish approbation in regard to sending consular agents to South American ports no longer under Spanish control. Lastly, it indicated that a positive step had been taken to safeguard British commerce by means of the consular agents.

Relations with the Spanish Government apparently experienced rejuvenation—a successful one judging by the amicable settlement

<sup>108</sup> Lanzas, *Independencia de America*, V, 489.

<sup>109</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 401-402.

<sup>110</sup> *Ibid.*, 402.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.*

made in March of 1823. Canning's letter to Stuart, January 10, 1823, spoke of the likely redress which Spain considered granting to Britain. Once the Spanish Minister gave assurance the matter of indemnifications was to be considered by the Cortes, directions were given to withdraw the British protecting squadron cruising the West Indies. Canning hoped there would be no future need for re-issuing such orders. Apparently, the threat of force alone was sufficient to bring about the desired objective.<sup>112</sup>

On January 9, 1823, Spain liberalized her commercial regulations. Trade to all provinces was granted to those nations with which the Spanish Government deemed convenient for a ten month period commencing from the date of publication. The January 9 decree also referred to the settlement of British claims.<sup>113</sup> On January 31, 1823, the Cortes issued another decree relative to foreign trade with Spain and her colonies.<sup>114</sup>

The next British victory came in the form of a convention signed by both powers on March 12, 1823. This agreement satisfactorily settled British claims arising from confiscations during the past seven years. The following are some of the principles decided upon in the convention. (1) A mixed commission consisting of two representatives each from Britain and Spain was to be appointed and was to meet in London within two weeks after the convention was signed. It was the duty of the above commission to decide upon the cases brought before it dealing with captured or seized British goods and ships dating as far back as July 4, 1808. Similar arrangements were made respecting Spanish goods and ships. (2) A sum of 40,000 reales was placed at the disposal of the commissioners to be used in settling the claims. This sum was to decrease or increase with necessity. (3) Spanish claims were to be paid by the British Government either in stock or money. (4) Only claims submitted within the first six months during which the commissioners deliberated would be admitted for consideration. The Anglo-Spanish convention proved to be a decisive British victory. The British interpreted the payment of their claims as an admission of the legality of their trade. This interpretation eventually became one of the bases used by the British to justify direct trade with the Spanish colonies. It must be remembered that while the Spanish were will-

<sup>112</sup> *Ibid.*, II, 111.

<sup>113</sup> *Coleccion de Las Decretos y Ordenes Generales Espedidos por Las Cortes Extraordinarias*, Que comprende desde 3 de Octubre de 1822 hasta 19 de Febrero de 1823, Madrid, 1823, X, 79-80.

<sup>114</sup> *British State Papers*, 1822-1823, 1034.



ing to arrange some modifications in their maritime laws, they still did not concede unlimited foreign free trade with their former colonies and those still under their domination.

Spain's indemnification formed part of Canning's speech to the House of Commons, April 14, 1823. Taking into consideration the fairly peaceful condition of Spain and Europe, Canning said the British Government deemed it advisable to call Spain's attention to an undeniable fact—Spain's inability to resubjugate the colonies. On this basis, Canning suggested Spain's recognition of colonial independence with a stipulation granting the mother country certain advantages. Canning stated such information had already been sent on to Madrid with the further notation that British desired no exclusive trade concessions with the Colonies in question.<sup>115</sup>

The reaction in Spain to the claims convention is also worth noting. It was entirely within the realm of possibility that Spain would resent the fairly large settlement she had to make. British interpretation of this convention also proved highly irritating. However, the April 24, 1823, memorial of the Minister for Foreign Affairs to the Cortes indicated another trend of thought. The memorial claimed friendly relations with Britain and referred to the amicable settlement respecting seizure of British merchant vessels, etc.<sup>116</sup>

No sooner was the ink on the claims agreement dry, when the British mercantile interests loudly clamored for political recognition. One letter destined to exert influence upon Canning was sent by the merchant Lowe who claimed recognition would eliminate the necessity for contraband trade.<sup>117</sup> Pressure to recognize the independent South American colonies or establish consular agents also came from other directions, e.g., the London merchants, the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, Belfast Chamber of Commerce and the London Times.<sup>118</sup> Contemporaries like Goldsmith expressed similar views.<sup>119</sup> Although recognition of South American colonies was postponed, Canning decided to take concrete steps to protect British commercial interests in this region. Within the first days of

<sup>115</sup> *Parliamentary Debates*, New Series, VIII, 890-891.

<sup>116</sup> *British State Papers*, 1822-1823, 972.

<sup>117</sup> John Lowe, "A Letter to the Right Hon. George Canning on the Policy of Recognizing the Independence of the South American States," *The Pamphleteer*, XXI, London, 1823, 407-408.

<sup>118</sup> Lawson, *British Policy*, 87-92.

<sup>119</sup> Lewis Goldsmith, "Observations on the Appointment of the Right Hon. Geo. Canning to the Foreign Department and on its Effects on the State of Society in England and on European Politics," *The Pamphleteer*, XXII, London, 1823, 330-333.

October 1823, he appointed commercial consuls to various South American ports.<sup>120</sup>

While the appointment of commercial consuls did not stress political recognition, Canning's discussion with Prince de Polignac, in October of 1823 initiated sentiments of a different character. Discussion of the Canning-Polignac memorandum follows. Canning said the British were of the opinion that Spain was completely helpless to regain her South American colonies and all negotiations to reunite the parent and colony would prove unsuccessful. While the British would not place any obstacles to prevent negotiations of this nature coming from Spain, Canning stated foreign assistance to Spain against the colonies would be liable to British veto. He disclaimed British territorial expansion in South America and stressed commercial intercourse with the former Spanish colonies. Then the question of recognition was mentioned. Since the British Government was convinced that Spain's colonial system could not be restored, the British could not bind themselves in any agreement which either refused or forestalled such recognition of the South American states.<sup>121</sup> Canning characterized Spanish pretensions to interdict foreign trade to the colonies as obsolete and wholly inapplicable to the British. He referred to the basis upon which the British were entitled to carry on South American trade. Canning believed such a privilege was conceded to Great Britain in 1810 when Spain asked for British mediation. In return for this mediation, Spain offered commercial privileges. Although Spain did not employ British mediation, Canning decided it was not practicable for Britain to withdraw her invested capital in South America nor to cease an existent trade. He argued it was distinctly understood that South American trade was open to British subjects, and that Spanish laws restricting this trade were "tacitly repealed." British demands for redress for confiscations were based upon this concession.<sup>122</sup> Canning's interpretation of a tacit agreement with Spain formed part of British justification for carrying on South American trade. His interpretation is sufficiently important to warrant additional treatment.

Following the publication of the memorandum on March 4, 1824, Canning's friend Sir James Mackintosh asked him about the treaty

<sup>120</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, I, 351.

<sup>121</sup> Harold Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, eds., *Foundations of British Foreign Policy, From Pitt (1792) to Salisbury (1902)*, Documents Old and New, Cambridge, 1938, 71.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 72-73.



which supposedly embodied the above mentioned "tacit repeal." Canning admitted there was no treaty in existence which did contain a review of Spanish commercial concessions to Britain. As regards the 1810 agreement, Canning remarked it was only an "understanding" between the two nations. This "understanding" included suspension of Spanish coastal laws as far as intercourse between the subjects of both nations were concerned. Canning stated there was no written instrument to substantiate such a claim.<sup>123</sup> Mackintosh asked a further question concerning a decree published by Ferdinand VII authorizing British trade to South America. Canning denied knowledge of such a decree and stated he knew of its existence "only as a matter of public notoriety."

Question arises whether or not Canning had any actual proof of Spanish concessions. One author claimed that he did since Canning would not publicly make a statement which could be refuted by Spain. Moreover, such Spanish refutation was not forthcoming. Spain's willingness to pay her claims in 1822 was judged as further evidence by the author to substantiate Canning's statements.<sup>124</sup> This author stated

the Spanish Government signed a convention to give redress for seizures of certain British vessels engaged in this Spanish colonial trade. By doing that she certainly gave not a "tacit," but an official and open, permission to England for this trade. Canning need not have gone back further than this year (1822) if he wished to establish the formal right.<sup>125</sup>

Still another historian claimed that a July 1810 edict printed in Cádiz, signed by the Minister of Finance, threw open South American trade to all nations not at war with Spain. However, the minister's signature was evidently obtained by fraud. Subsequently, the Minister was dismissed after the Junta disavowed the legality of the edict. Canning might have read this edict with the assumption of its genuine nature but discovered his error later on. His actions proved he was not prepared to quote or defend the edict as a document in British possession and proof of commercial concessions.<sup>126</sup>

Another group of historians who edited the Polignac Memorandum devised a third interpretation of Canning's announcement of a "tacit" agreement. These observations follow. When pressed in Parliament, Canning denied the existence of any treaty granting commercial concessions. He said there was merely a "gentleman's agree-

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 523.

<sup>124</sup> *Ibid.*, 523-524.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.*, 524, Miss Goebel.

<sup>126</sup> *Ibid.*, Miss Horsfall.

ment" that England could trade without official permission. This same idea applies to Canning's statement about its being "distinctly understood" that Spain's coastal laws were "tacitly repealed." Inference was made that the Spanish Government, in 1809, might have admitted an informal understanding whereby she would wink at British trade in return for mediation. This idea, however, cannot be found in official documents. Only private papers showed a slight trace of this suggestion. This third group of historians suggested the possibility that Spain's weakening position at home might have forced an unofficial concession to save face. Tacit winking at British colonial trade would have protected the Spanish Government from internal criticism and at the same time satisfied British traders with vested interests in South America. The convention of 1822 was interpreted as acknowledging the existence of the "tacit compact" accorded British trade during earlier years. Why Spain never contested Canning's statement was strange, the historians remarked. The obvious reason, they said, was that Spain did not wish to raise the question concerning the consent to trade because it meant revealing earlier negotiations with the British. Canning knew Spain could not afford to do this in 1823. The possibility also existed that Henry Wellesley supplied Canning with information about the 1810 decree and the "tacit" consent without support of documents. Since Wellesley was a close friend of Canning's, such an explanation was not too extreme. The historians concluded that Canning never would have published a memorandum not based on "fact."<sup>127</sup>

As is evident from the above discussion, pre-1815 edicts and "tacit" agreements were used by the British to sanction the trade carried on in South American markets. Several remarks made by the historians just discussed need amplification. For example, the statement that Spain never refuted British claims needs modifications. Secondly, Canning's reference to a "tacit" agreement could be explained in another manner. Perhaps the Spanish did offer concessions in return for mediation. Once the mediation was forsaken for one reason or another, the Spanish believed the other half of the agreement null and void. Particularly referring to 1815-1818 offers of mediation, the fact that Spain did not avail herself of British mediation, did not, perhaps, in the eyes of the British, mean the reward for that mediation was also voided. This same interpretation could have applied in 1810. Numerous other questions arise concerning historical interpretation of the commercial concessions issue.

<sup>127</sup> *Ibid.*, 525-526, Temperley and Penson.

What motivated Spain to acknowledge British protestations of seizures in 1822? Was it due to a realization of the legality of British claims or due to other elements, e.g., the weakened position of the country and the French threat? Did Canning have any actual proof to back his statements or was his argument based on Wellesley's communications? Did any such unwritten "tacit compact" exist? Most of the information comes from British sources. Thus far, no concrete Spanish documentation of any "tacit" agreement between Spain and Great Britain has been found to corroborate British interpretation.

What was Spanish reaction to British activity and declarations of the last few months? On November 8, 1823, Court wrote to Canning recounting a plan formed by the Spanish Government to establish the South American Company. The ultimate objective of this company was to recover control over the now independent and disobedient colonies. According to Court, this South American Company was to be formed through shares supposedly bought by European monied men. Spain proposed to give great commercial privileges to this company and allot mines as the security for recovering the colonies. The various expeditions to suppress the colonials were to proceed under the direction of this company, although technically they would be carried on in the name of the Spanish king. This project, as Court said, was a favorite topic of discussion in Madrid. However, no decision regarding the actual establishment of the company was made.<sup>128</sup>

There was some indication that certain members of the Spanish Government favored a relaxation of monopolistic commercial regulations. Court wrote to Canning on January 14, 1824, about a conversation with M. de Ofalia. According to Court, Ofalia stated

that our [British] political interests as a monarchy were decidedly on the side of Spain in this question, [separation of colonies from Spain] and that with respect to our commercial interests, there was nothing we could ask that Spain would not be ready to grant; that orders had even already been sent to every place where the King's authority was respected, to interfere in no way with the British commerce.<sup>129</sup>

The truth of the above statement could not be positively established by the writer. However, it is important because it illustrated Spain's willingness to form closer and friendlier relations with Britain.

<sup>128</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 405.

<sup>129</sup> *Ibid.*, 411-412.

Whether this change of heart was due to a genuine belief in liberalizing commerce or forced by recent British policy, e.g., Polignac Memorandum and appointment of consuls, is impossible to say.

While Spain sought British friendship she still looked with fond glances at the possibility of restoring her colonies through armed foreign intervention. The Spanish suggested a conference with foreign powers to take place in Paris. Upon receipt of the Spanish invitation, Canning told Bagot in a January 22, 1824, letter, that there would be no conference with the British in it.<sup>130</sup> He referred to the proposed conference in his letter to Court on January 30, 1824, making the following statement:

The subjects of His Majesty have for many years carried on trade and formed commercial connections in all the American Provinces which have declared their separation from Spain. This trade was originally opened with the consent of the Spanish Government. It has grown gradually to such an extent as to require some direct protection by the establishment at several ports and places in those Provinces of Consuls on the part of this country: a measure long deferred out of delicacy to Spain, and not resorted to at last without long previous notification to the Spanish Government.<sup>131</sup>

Once more Canning referred to Spanish consent but did not back his reasoning with documentation. He still indicated Britain would be willing to mediate Spanish colonial differences but only upon a liberal basis, which included a revision of Spain's maritime regulations.<sup>132</sup>

Realization that Spain was not likely to liberalize her monopolistic control over her former colonies stimulated a feverish demand for early recognition of the stable, independent governments in South America. The contemporary periodicals together with mercantile groups spurred this movement on in Parliament. Additional driving force came from the members of Parliament itself, e.g., Earl of Liverpool. Canning favored the use of commercial treaties as a means to effect *de facto* recognition.<sup>133</sup> On December 31, 1824, he told Bagot that only one course was open to the British—recognition.<sup>134</sup>

Canning no longer attempted to justify British commercial activity solely as an end in itself. He now wanted to grant recognition for

<sup>130</sup> Josceline Bagot, *George Canning and His Friends*, London, 1909, II, 222.

<sup>131</sup> Webster, *Britain and Independence*, II, 414.

<sup>132</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>133</sup> *Ibid.*, 431.

<sup>134</sup> Bagot, *Canning and Friends*, II, 277.

a wider, more significant purpose—the acknowledgement of a series of new governments. With the *de facto* recognition of the South American states came greater security for British commerce. Canning urged mediation but on another basis—Spanish recognition of the new South American republics. All controversy over British rights to trade with the South American colonies gave way to a more important decision of recognition. On January 1, 1825, England recognized the independence of the South American states. Thus, Canning "called a new world into existence to redress the balance of the old."<sup>135</sup>

Once recognition was accorded to the South American governments, Canning proceeded to arrange a series of commercial treaties. One of the important facts evident in the above treaties is that no effort was made to obtain exclusive trade privileges. In this respect, the British were consistent. Even after the British recognized the independent political existence of certain South American governments and concluded commercial treaties with them, Spain refused to admit the legality of these last two measures. Whatever the reason, Spain was unable to enforce her position.

The following conclusions are evident from the study. (1) Expediency characterized British foreign and commercial policy, modified to suit the changing status of the South American colonies and the needs of British commercial interests. Relations between Spain and Britain at times were friendly and on other occasions most unsatisfactory. Under a pretext of friendship there was much animosity and bitter feeling. (2) British policy, under the constant watchfulness of Castlereagh and Canning, developed in the following manner. All during the 1815 and 1825 period, Britishers claimed the right to trade with the Spanish colonies. The Spaniards denied the existence of any such right. There was no written document whereby the British position could be verified. To prove that such a right existed, the British referred to a "tacit compact" dating back as far as 1810 wherein the Spanish commercial laws restricting trade were supposedly repealed. Spain, through the Cortes and Ferdinand VII, denied this.

After 1815, Spain renewed her promise to grant trade concessions as a reward for British mediation. Although the mediation was never carried out, the British insisted they were entitled to the "reward." The mediation fell through basically because Britain

<sup>135</sup> Wellesley, *Diary and Correspondence*, 131.



refused to use force to reunite the colonies to Spain. Spain insisted that the trade concessions would be granted only upon successful completion of the mediation.

When it became increasingly apparent that Spain could no longer control the revolting colonies nor effect a successful blockade of South American ports, the British branded the blockade as illegal. Spain protested and turned in the direction of the legitimacy-minded European powers for intervention. The possibility of such intervention speeded the adoption of measures designed to protect British commercial interests already flourishing in South America. Pressure from mercantile groups was strong and aided the passage of legislation.

The cries from vested commercial interests further resulted in the sending of naval squadrons to rid the South American waters of Spanish privateers and pirates. Spain objected to what she termed illegal trade and made efforts to cripple British commerce. The resulting confiscations of merchant vessels brought forth British protests. After a period of applied pressure, Spain acknowledged British grievances and paid the indemnity. The Spanish settlement was interpreted, by the British, as admission of the right to trade.

Time proved that greater protection was necessary if British commerce was to continue to grow without continual interference from Spain. It became more evident to the British that Spain would not grant unrestricted direct trade and even if she did, it would still not be secure. Canning then used the theory of *de facto* recognition for independent South American states. By 1825, Canning decided to grant this recognition by means of commercial treaties. Spain refused to acknowledge the independence of the colonies and did so only after many more years of controversy with the colonials. Spanish objections mattered little to the British who achieved their objective. Recognition sealed the legality of direct trade to South America.

BERNADINE PIETRASZEK

Loyola University, Chicago

## The Frontier Army Officer, 1794-1814

A recent writer, concerned with the subject of "blind spots" in the historiography of the trans-Mississippi west, emphasizes the need for research on subjects pertaining to the recent past: agriculture, the railroads, mining, industry, banking, lumbering, and the tourist trade. This authority considers the subject of military history as having been adequately treated.<sup>1</sup> It is the thesis of the present study that more attention should be given to the role of military and related civilian personnel in the development of the frontier community. This paper attempts to portray the status of the frontier army officer in the period indicated, with emphasis on his relation to the civilian community.

Then, as now, the authority of the army officer rested upon an executive commission granted by the president. In contrast to present methods of procurement, practically all commissions were granted upon direct application by the candidate. Frequently, it would seem, a candidate owed his success more to the efforts of his political friends than to his own qualifications.<sup>2</sup> The relative rank of officers of the same grade was determined by lottery.<sup>3</sup> Then, as now, a commissioned officer could resign his commission, but in the small army of that day the resignation of a captain might be so important a matter that the secretary of war would make special

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<sup>1</sup> John Walton Caughey, "The Mosaic of Western History," *The Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, XXXIII, No. 4, 595-606.

<sup>2</sup> Thus in 1810 a civilian candidate applied for a field appointment, accompanying his application with letters from the attorney general of the United States, two senators, and ten members of the House of Representatives! Dr. Alexander Macauley to Secretary of War, 22 March, 1810, War Office, Letters Received, V, 260. Another applicant for a captain's commission submitted recommendations from thirty different persons. Curtis Price to Secretary of War, 4 January, 1812, *ibid.*, VI, 367. See also Ferdinand L. Claiborne to Governor Holmes, 7 September, 1811, in C. E. Carter (Ed.), *The Territorial Papers of the United States*, 20 vols., Washington, 1934-, VI, 221-222 (cited hereafter as "Carter"). Unless otherwise stated references in this paper are to materials in the Old Records Section, Adjutant General's Office, The National Archives.

<sup>3</sup> General Philip Reade, "Partial Military Biography and Alphabetical Arrangement of Officers of the Legion of the United States . . .," unpublished manuscript in the Filson Club, Louisville, Ky. (referred to henceforth as "Reade MS."), 409 ff.

arrangements to keep him in the service.<sup>4</sup> Officers planning to resign generally put out their bids for civilian employment previous to their leaving the army.<sup>5</sup>

It is safe to conclude that, compared with the average person in the frontier community, the frontier officer was among the *élite* in respect to education. Officers were generally competent in language and learning, though undoubtedly very few of these men were, like William Henry Harrison, products of college training and students of history.<sup>6</sup> West Point, though opened in 1802, did not in this period contribute heavily to the education of army officers. In that period a knowledge of the elementary branches was all that was necessary for admittance to the highest military school.<sup>7</sup> The only required reading for western officers was the Articles of War. In 1806 a revision of this code was made and copies were distributed to all commands.<sup>8</sup> In 1809 the War Office also distributed to the posts Alexander Macomb's *Martial Law*.<sup>9</sup>

Army officers dressed resplendently. In 1796 certain changes were made in the direction of simplicity, but gold and silver epaulets, embroidered cuffs and pockets, and plumes continued in use.<sup>10</sup> A captain in 1804 paid sixty-six dollars for a uniform coat, this including freight charges from Philadelphia.<sup>11</sup> Such a coat must have been

<sup>4</sup> See Wilkinson to Secretary of War, 27 July, 1805, in Carter, XIII, 167; Secretary of War to Wilkinson, 16 October, 1805, *ibid.*, 240.

<sup>5</sup> See Rufus Easton to the Attorney General, 13 March, 1806, Carter, VI, 121; Governor Holmes to Capt. E. P. Gaines, 28 September, 1810, *ibid.*, VII, 347; James W. Silver, *Edmund Pendleton Gaines*, New Orleans, 1949, 28.

<sup>6</sup> Daniel Webster, then Secretary of State, in revising Harrison's inaugural address, said the old general had killed "seventeen Roman proconsuls as dead as smelts." H. J. Webster, "William Henry Harrison's Administration of Indiana Territory," *Indiana Historical Society Publications*, IV, No. 1, 183-184.

<sup>7</sup> See Jonathan Jennings to James Monroe, 27 January, 1813, in Dorothy Riker, "Unedited Letters of Jonathan Jennings," *ibid.*, X, No. 4, 147-278.

<sup>8</sup> Secretary of War to Commanding Officers, 19 May, 1806, War Office, Military Book, III, 15. For the Articles of War as revised see Alexander Macomb, *A Treatise on Martial Law and Courts-Martial; as practised in the United States of America*, Charleston, 1809.

<sup>9</sup> Same to Commanding Officer, Fort Massac, 8 June, 1809, War Office, Military Book, IV, 131.

<sup>10</sup> For a description of the uniforms of the period see W. A. Ganoe, *The History of the United States Army*, New York, 1936, 106. Evidently division and area commanders could also prescribe the uniform to be worn. See Orders, Cantonment Washington, 6 August, 1810, in Post Revolutionary War Records, Vol. 155 (cited hereafter as "Orders, Cantonment Washington").

<sup>11</sup> Entry in Morrison Day Book, 3 April-17 November, 1804, 104 (dated 13 October, 1804), Morrison Papers, Chester Public Library, Chester, Illinois. This valuable collection is composed of the daily journals of the Bryan and Morrison general store at Kaskaskia.

impressive to the homely-clad frontiersman, and worn, as it was, by an officer whose pay was only thirty-five dollars per month. Indeed, the cloth coat was the imprimatur of the military gentleman.<sup>12</sup> This same coat and its epaulets must have been a great temptation to hostile Indians.<sup>13</sup>

The wardrobe of the frontier officer could be elaborate. The inventory of clothing and other possessions of Captain Jesse Lukens, who died at Wilkinsonville in 1801, reveals the following:

- 3 uniform coats, two laced
- 4 other coats, including a surcoat
- 9 pairs fine breeches
- 18 pairs "overalls" and other breeches
- 15 vests, some in silk and scarlet
- 3 hats, including one fur cap
- 3 pairs boots, long and short
- 9 pairs silk stockings

This same officer evidently blew his nose on silk handkerchiefs, slept on a regular four-poster bed and mattress under rose-colored blankets, three of which are mentioned, and ate off white tablecloths. His household furnishings were quite expensive, while his personal possessions included a set of portable type for printing and a case of mathematical instruments. He had no books, but possessed sixteen pictures, seven large and nine small. The total assessed valuation of his personal property was \$437.72.<sup>14</sup> While it cannot be assumed that every western officer lived after the style of Captain Lukens, his case shows what one with a flair for dress could do on the frontier of that period.

<sup>12</sup> The English traveller, Blane, tells a story of General Scott drinking a toast to a Kentuckian, whom, by his coat, he took to be an officer. The Kentuckian, however, assured the General that he had never held a commission. "'Well then, by heavens!' said the old general, 'you are the first man in Kentucky that ever wore a cloth coat, and was not a commissioned officer'." William Newnham Blane, *An Excursion Through the United States and Canada during the Years 1822-1823*, London, 1824, 111-112.

<sup>13</sup> Judge Harry Toulmin of Mississippi Territory, referring to Choctaw hostility to Americans, tells how officers concealed their epaulets to avoid becoming targets for the Indians. Judge Toulmin to William Lattimore, 12 November, 1815, Carter, VI, 567.

<sup>14</sup> "Inventory of Clothing, Furniture &c the Property of the late Captain Jesse Lukens, deceased, with their appraised Value... as appraised... At Wilkinson Ville this 24th day of May 1801" (photostat in the hands of the author). The late Theodore Calvin Pease, in a conversation with the author, once expressed himself as completely unable to explain what Alphonse de la Buissonnière, an eighteenth century French officer in the Illinois Country, could have been doing with over 100 shirts. See Natalia Mareé Belting, *Kaskaskia Under the French Régime*, Urbana, 1948, 50.

The commissioned officer was allowed a personal servant, either in the person of a slave or of a soldier from the ranks. Servants were rationed at the public expense.<sup>15</sup> Officers posted in slave states or territories were encouraged to purchase a slave rather than to take servants from the ranks.<sup>16</sup>

The officer, then as now, found it hard to live upon his salary, even though that salary placed him among the "moneyed class" in a community where "hard money" was at a premium.<sup>17</sup> Added to his regular salary were perquisites such as having his baggage moved free of charge.<sup>18</sup> Henry Dearborn, Jefferson's first secretary of war, was said to have been unpopular with the officers (many of whom were Federalists in politics), chiefly because of "a somewhat narrow disposition in settling accounts. . . ."<sup>19</sup> Officers assigned to special duty, such as the work of an adjutant or of a quartermaster, received a small additional remuneration, this varying in accordance with the size of the military unit to which the officer was attached.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>15</sup> Duplicate rations for military servants were, however, forbidden by an order of 1794. General Orders, 28 January, 1794, Wayne Orderly Book, IV, 113, manuscript in the Filson Club, Louisville, Kentucky. (Unless otherwise indicated future references to the Wayne Orderly Books are made to these volumes and not to printed versions.) See also Secretary of War to Paymaster General, 1 November, 1808, War Office, Military Book, III, 438; same to same, 12 November, 1811, *ibid.*, V, 233.

<sup>16</sup> Secretary of War to Seth Hunt, 10 November, 1804, Carter, XIII, 73.

<sup>17</sup> The pay scale for officers and men as fixed in 1785-1787 was as follows:

Lieutenant Colonels Commandant .....	\$50 per month.
Majors .....	\$45 per month.
Captains .....	\$35 per month.
Lieutenants .....	\$26 per month.
Ensigns .....	\$20 per month.
Surgeons .....	\$45 per month.
Surgeon's Mates .....	\$30 per month.
Sergeants .....	\$ 6 per month.
Corporals .....	\$ 5 per month.
Musicians .....	\$ 5 per month.
Privates .....	\$ 4 per month.

In lieu of subsistence majors and lieutenant colonels got \$20 per month, captains \$12, lieutenants, ensigns, and surgeon's mates \$8. A surgeon got \$16 per month in lieu of subsistence. Forage allowances amounted to \$12 per month for majors and \$6 per month for company officers and surgeons. "Military Force in 1789," *American State Papers, Military Affairs*, I, 5, (cited hereafter as "ASP, Mil. Aff.").

<sup>18</sup> Secretary of War to Seth Hunt, 10 November, 1804, Carter, XIII, 72-73.

<sup>19</sup> Benjamin Henry Latrobe, *The Journal of Latrobe, Being the Notes and Sketches of an Architect, Naturalist and Traveller in the United States from 1796 to 1820*, New York, 1905, 266.

<sup>20</sup> In 1808 a maximum of \$8 per month was allowed for these duties. Secretary of War to Governor Hull, 22 January, 1808, Carter, X, 178.



The frontier officer did not fail to urge the government to raise his salary. In 1805, a "Round Robin" of officers at St. Louis, petitioned for an increase in pay, pointing out that "the present price of almost every article necessary for their use is threefold what it could be purchased for in the United States in 1792..."<sup>21</sup> Captain E. P. Gaines once complained that economical officers "have frequently to witness that, young lads in a counting House, who measured the cloth for their Regimental Coats; charged the amount,—and perhaps called frequently in vain for payment,—receive a much larger salary than the officers themselves." Gaines added that a captain's pay in Mississippi Territory was at that time "totally inadequate to his comfortable support..."<sup>22</sup> In 1807 a substantial increase in military pay was granted.<sup>23</sup>

The officer might receive advances on his pay, as General Wilkinson once received an anticipation of six months.<sup>24</sup> Another convenience to the officer was the arrangement whereby his wife or other dependents might be given a part or all of his pay, which anticipated the present system of allotments to dependents.<sup>25</sup>

One of the means whereby the frontier officer might increase his income was through holding civil offices. Thus he might serve as a civil magistrate in taking oaths and depositions or as the fore-

<sup>21</sup> "Memorial to Congress by Thomas Hunt and Other Army Officers," 8 November, 1805, Carter, XIII, 267-268.

<sup>22</sup> Captain E. P. Gaines to Secretary of War, 15 April, 1808, Carter, V, 625.

<sup>23</sup> The new pay scale was established as follows:

Rank	Pay per month	Forage Allowance	Rations per day
Colonels	\$75	\$12	\$6
Lt. Colonels	\$60	\$11	\$5
Majors	\$50	\$10	\$4
Surgeons	\$45	\$10	\$3
Surgeon's Mates	\$30	\$ 6	\$2
Adjutants	\$10	\$ 6	—
Captains	\$40	—	\$3
First Lieutenants	\$30	—	\$2
Second Lieutenants	\$25	—	\$2
Ensigns	\$20	—	\$2
Music Teachers	\$ 9	—	\$1
Sergeants	\$10	—	\$1
Corporals	\$ 8	—	\$1
Musicians	\$ 8	—	\$1
Privates	\$ 7	—	\$1

"Estimates of the expenses of a Regiment of Infantry, per annum, ... 1807," ASP, *Mil. Aff.*, I, 225.

<sup>24</sup> Secretary of War to Wilkinson, 16 January, 1809, Military Book, IV, 13.

<sup>25</sup> Secretary of War to Mrs. Ann Wilkinson, 18 April, 1803, War Office, Military Book, 10 November, 1803 — 17 November, 1803, 451.

man of a coroner's jury.<sup>26</sup> Again, the post commandant might serve as postmaster in lieu of a civilian.<sup>27</sup>

Another important civilian post sometimes occupied by the military commandant was that of collector of internal revenue. This arrangement was found at posts which were ports of entry *vis-à-vis* Spanish or British Territory. Thus Fort Massac was made a port of entry in 1799. Though the first collector at that post was a civilian, the office was given in 1802 to Captain Daniel Bissell, the post commandant, whose military status was not affected. In case of his transfer to another post Bissell might appoint an agent to do the work.<sup>28</sup> It is evident that military control over such a position was not always pleasing to the local civilians, especially to those concerned with financial and commercial enterprise.<sup>29</sup> There was also the case of Lieutenant Andrew Marschalk, who, while still in the army, became the first printer for Mississippi Territory, being "furloughed" for that purpose.<sup>30</sup>

Another office normally held by a civilian but sometimes occupied by a military officer was the post of Indian agent. Normally the post commandant dealt with the Indians only in extending hospitality or comity to them.<sup>31</sup> Indian diplomacy was the province of the

<sup>26</sup> *Dedimus Potestatem*, Able vs. Archambeau, 2 December, 1801, Randolph County Circuit Court, Misc. Papers; Executive Journal, Indiana Territory, 1 September, 1801, *Ind. Hist. Soc. Pub.*, III, 104; "Coroner's Inquest over Unknown Body," 3 October, 1806; Coroner's Inquest on the Body of Stephen Brusher, 10 December, 1806, both in Randolph County Circuit Court, Misc. Papers.

<sup>27</sup> Thus in 1806, Lieutenant E. P. Gaines was serving as postmaster at Fort Stoddert. Postmaster General to the Chairman, House Committee on Claims, 26 March, 1806, Carter, V, 454. For such service the officer evidently received the regular compensation allowed civilian appointees. Same to same, 10 July, 1806, *ibid.*, 468.

<sup>28</sup> Inspector General to Bissell, 8 December, 1802, Inspector's Office, Letters Sent, September, 1800 — April, 1803, 382. Bissell resigned this appointment in 1803. Bissell to Secretary of War, 18 November, 1803, War Office, Letters Received, II, 22; same to same, 6 February, 1803, *ibid.*, 16. Lt. Edmund P. Gaines, in addition to holding the postmastership at Fort Stoddert, also held the internal revenue collectorship. Gaines to the President, 4 August, 1806, Carter, V, 472.

<sup>29</sup> Petition of Natchez Merchants, 13 October, 1803, Carter, V, 263-264. In this case the merchants complained against Fort Adams as a port of entry.

<sup>30</sup> Governor Sargent to Major Thomas Cushing, 21 July, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, 8-9; Cushing to Sargent, 23 July, 1799, *ibid.*, Letters Sent, 14-15. The letter book of Major Cushing, Letters Sent, covers the period 14 July, 1799 — 11 March, 1800; and Letters Received the period 15 April — 2 November, 1799.

<sup>31</sup> For policy on this matter, see Inspector General to western commandants, 2 August, 1802, Inspector's Office, Letters Sent, September, 1800-April, 1803, 320; Secretary of War to James S. Swearingen, 9 May, 1806, War Office, Military Book, III, 12. See also extract, General Alexander Hamilton to Colonel J. F. Hamtramck, 23 May, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, 19-20.

Indian agent.<sup>32</sup> The exigencies of war and the incidents of military movement did not always permit the maintenance of a civilian agent at the military post. In such cases, the military officer logically assumed the functions of that office.<sup>33</sup>

Another function performed by the military commandant was that of property custodian not only for military property, but at times for the property of other governmental departments and even private citizens. This function grew in part out of the difficulties of transportation which sometimes made it necessary that the property of both government offices and private individuals be intrusted to the care of the military. Too, the death or resignation of responsible civilian officials might place their records under the temporary care of the military authority at hand.<sup>34</sup>

References have even been found to the post commandant's functioning as land agent, though this was not authorized. Major Doyle, and other early commandants made land grants on the military reservation at Fort Massac, allegedly as an encouragement to the development of a civilian community about the post, which would in time furnish supplies "for the Troop [sic] that might be kept there. . . ." In all, fifty-nine such grants were made.<sup>35</sup> In 1811 all

<sup>32</sup> Major Thomas Doyle, who rebuilt Fort Massac in 1794, complained bitterly of his lack of authority to deal with the Indians. Doyle to Wayne, 11, 20 May, 1794, in *Historical Society of Pennsylvania* (cited hereafter as "HSP").

<sup>33</sup> See Caldwell, "Fort Massac: The American Frontier Post, 1778-1805," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society*, XLIII, No. 4 (Winter, 1950), 270 ff.; J. B. Varnum, Jr., to Secretary of War, 26 June, 1811, Carter, X, 362 (concerning the vacancy of the post of Indian agent at Mackinac). This last reference states that "in the meantime however the Commanding Officer at this Post, will continue to transact the business of that Department (i.e., the Indian Office). . . ."

<sup>34</sup> Michael Jones to Secretary of Treasury, 30 April, 1805, Carter, VIII, 286-287. Thomas Dean, travelling to Fort Harrison in 1817, tells how Major John T. Chunn, commanding officer at that post, offered "to put our boat under the care of the guard at the fort, that it should not be injured or taken away." John C. Dean (Ed.), "Journal of Thomas Dean," *Ind. Hist. Soc. Pub.*, VI, No. 2, 332.

<sup>35</sup> Petition to Congress by Inhabitants of Fort Massac, 10 January, 1805; Deposition of William Kelley, 28 January, 1805; Deposition of Richard Lord, 28 January, 1805; Deposition of John McClain, undated, all in Carter, VII, 252 ff. It seems clear that the officers making these grants did not pretend to give full titles. Quite likely these early commandants merely bowed to civilian pressure in the performance of a function that earlier colonial post commandants, whether French or British, had performed. That the civilians involved had made some sacrifice in going to an unsettled area, particularly a very unhealthy one, is evident. However, they may have overdrawn this a bit when they referred to those of their number who had been "call'd to the silent shades of death and entombed in the rubbish of the wilderness. . . ." as a result! One was pretty apt to get such a call most anywhere in the frontier of those days.

these claims were rejected by the Kaskaskia Land Office.<sup>36</sup> The following year the post commandant at Fort Massac was instructed to give no more individuals possession of lands about the fort "as such possession might hereafter be used to establish a title in the occupant."<sup>37</sup> A similar claim for lands near Fort Harrison, evidently originating in the same manner, was also refused.<sup>38</sup>

The above activities and offices enabled the commissioned officer at one time or another to increase his financial income, while at the same time the exercise of these functions added to his prestige in the civil community.<sup>39</sup> His retirement from the army was less a change in many cases than might be supposed, for in the army or out, the commissioned officer was already among what one writer has called the "upper crust" of the frontier community.<sup>40</sup>

The role of the frontier officer as a civilian office-holder may have had something to do with the spirit of independence he often showed toward superior military authority. On the surface it might seem that the post commandant stationed in the western country was more dependent on his superiors than the modern officer in command of a military installation. The army was smaller, the secretary of war could give more personal attention and direction to the various organizations and commands, and the chain of command was more direct than is the case today.<sup>41</sup> One is surprised that a colonel in command of a military district would ask for authority to visit the various posts under his command.<sup>42</sup> Again, this same officer felt obliged to communicate with distant Washington the request of a hard-pressed subordinate at Fort Madison for help against threatening Indian attacks on the eve of the War of 1812.<sup>43</sup> General Wilkin-

<sup>36</sup> "A Statement of claims in virtue of improvements within the district of Kaskaskia, rejected by the Board," 1811, ASP, *Public Lands*, II, 120.

<sup>37</sup> Secretary of War to Commanding Officer, Fort Massac, 21 July, 1812, War Office, Military Book, VI, 38.

<sup>38</sup> Secretary of War to Major John T. Chunn, 13 October, 1816, Carter, VIII, 444-445.

<sup>39</sup> Sometimes, no doubt, job-hungry civilians resented the intrusion of the army officer into the area of civilian employment. Thus in 1807 citizens near Fort Stoddert presented President Jefferson a petition against Captain E. P. Gaines who was then "holding three or four government positions at the same time". Silver, *Gaines*, 17-18.

<sup>40</sup> See William B. Hamilton, "The Southwestern Frontier, 1795-1817: An Essay in Social History," *Journal of Southern History*, X, No. 4, 389-403.

<sup>41</sup> Correspondence between officers in command and the secretary of war was common-place, and subalterns and even common soldiers did not hesitate to communicate with the highest authority.

<sup>42</sup> See Lt. Col. Daniel Bissell to Secretary of War, 20 January, 1812, Carter, XIV, 508; Secretary of War to Bissell, 17 March, 1812, *ibid.*, 530.

<sup>43</sup> Captain Horatio Stark to Bissell, 7 February, 1812, enclosure in Bissell to Secretary of War, 19 February, 1812, both in *ibid.*, 520-522.

son, commanding the army in the west, was even forbidden in 1805 to appoint a successor to a colonel deceased at New Orleans.<sup>44</sup>

These examples, however, do not reveal the officer, especially the post commandant, in his true light. After all, the commissioned officer at a lonely outpost was often far removed from both Washington and his immediate superiors. Frequently he was faced with the necessity of acting upon his own authority. Too, he was often the only adequate judge of his actions. Sometimes, as would seem to be the case with General Wilkinson, he may have been more clever than his superiors. Or, he might play one of his opponents off against the other.<sup>45</sup>

It is because of his independent spirit and not infrequent high-handed acts that the frontier officer was often brought before courts-martial or subjected to other military discipline. Sometimes he earned a nickname on this account, as witness the case of Major Thomas Doyle, who rebuilt Fort Massac in 1794, and who, because of his spirit, was called "King" Doyle. This officer dared to defy an order of General Wilkinson to permit a boat bound for New Madrid and carrying some Spaniards arrested as the accused murderers of Henry Owen, a prominent Kentuckian, to pass Fort Massac, all because the major reasoned that the accused should be tried on the soil where they had committed their crime!<sup>46</sup> This act so enraged Wilkinson that he placed Doyle under arrest for what he called "unwarrantable interference" in the case of the Spaniards, stemming from the major's "informity [sic] of Judgment and pride of office."<sup>47</sup> In preferring charges against the major, however, Wilkinson did not base his case on the affair with the Spaniards, but rather upon other allegations, which included drunkenness, disrespect for a superior, and theft of government property!<sup>48</sup> In the end no trial

<sup>44</sup> It is true that the deceased officer, Lt. Col. Thomas Butler, was one of Wilkinson's bitterest enemies. He alone had resisted Wilkinson's famous "short hair" order of 1801. Secretary of War to Wilkinson, 21 November, 1805, Carter, XIII, 290; Wilkinson to Secretary of War, 30 December, 1805, *ibid.*, 349.

<sup>45</sup> Silver, *Gaines*, 8; Major Thomas Cushing to Captain B. Shamburgh, 4 September, 1799; Shamburgh to Cushing, 3 September, 1799; same to same, 20 October, 1799, in Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, n. p., and Letters Sent, n. p.

<sup>46</sup> For a discussion of the case, see Humphrey Marshall, *History of Kentucky*, II, Frankfort, 1824, 154-155; Reade MS., 216. Pertinent military correspondence is found in Doyle to Wayne, 28 June, 20 August, 1795; Doyle to Portell, 20 January, 1795; Portell to Doyle, 23 January, 1795, HSP.

<sup>47</sup> Wilkinson to Harry Innes, 24 April, 1795, Innes Papers, Library of Congress.

<sup>48</sup> "A true copy of the charges, exhibited against Major Thomas Doyle. —," 2 February, 1796, War Office, Letters Sent and Received, 1796, Box 7.



resulted, since Doyle was supported by General Wayne, who hated Wilkinson, and who permitted Doyle to retire honorably from the army.<sup>49</sup>

Another officer who defied Wilkinson successfully was Major Seth Hunt, a man who held a brevet commission as military commandant of Ste. Geneviève in Louisiana Territory. Hunt, evidently a man of volatile temperment, is said to have "evinced too much spirit to please the governor." This affair smacks of the political differences between Federalist officers such as Wilkinson and his son, Lieutenant James B. Wilkinson, on the one hand, and the followers of President Jefferson on the other. Hunt was challenged to a duel by Wilkinson's son and another officer, but refused to accept. Later Hunt and one of his friends were assaulted in their quarters by friends and relatives of the general. Hunt challenged these men, but Wilkinson forbade the duels.<sup>50</sup>

James McFarlane, a special Indian agent sent to the Arkansas country in 1808 to investigate illicit trade there, complained that Captain George Armistead, commandant of Arkansas Post, refused "to act further than he thinks proper, and says that he has no superior officer. . . ." When McFarlane showed the captain his instructions, the latter still refused to cooperate and remarked that even if the Louisiana Governor himself were there "he should not take this authority out of his hands."<sup>51</sup> Governor Holmes of Mississippi Territory complained that when one of his justices issued a civil process against certain persons in the army, the civil officer authorized to serve the precept "was resisted in the exercise of his duty, by a military officer's refusing to permit him to take out of the cantonment the persons he had arrested by virtue of the Warrant. . . ."<sup>52</sup>

On occasion post commandants even dared to leave their posts or to make military movements without authority. Andrew Ellicott, the Federalist agent sent to the lower Mississippi in 1797, persuaded Lieutenant Percy Smith Pope, commonly known as "Crazy Pope,"

<sup>49</sup> Doyle to Wilkinson, 23 September, 1795, Wayne MSS., Library of Congress; Doyle to Wayne, 22 November, 1795, *ibid.*; Wayne Orderly Book, IX, *Michigan Pioneer and Historical Collections*, XXXIV, 657; Wayne to Doyle, 15 April, 1795, HSP.

<sup>50</sup> Pertinent correspondence concerning this matter may be found in Carter, XIII, 208, ff.

<sup>51</sup> James McFarlane to Governor Lewis, 11 December, 1808; inclosure in Clark to Secretary of War, 29 April, 1809, both in Carter, XIV, 264-268.

<sup>52</sup> Governor Holmes to Colonel Thomas H. Cushing, 20 June, 1800, Carter, VI, 74-75.

to descend with his troops from Fort Massac to Natchez against the orders of General Wayne.<sup>53</sup> In 1811 Lt. Col. Richard Sparks organized a private expedition against the Spanish at Mobile, ordering United States troops to make certain dispositions to this end. Acquitted by a court martial, Sparks was referred to President Madison because of the "novel" nature of the case.<sup>54</sup>

Many examples could be cited of moral lapses on the part of frontier officers. Major Doyle says he was obliged to arrest Captain Isaac Guion, his next ranking officer in the detachment en route to the lower Ohio to reconstruct Fort Massac in 1794, because Guion "was determined to take his mistress with him contrary to my possitive [sic] order to the Contrary—."<sup>55</sup> In 1796 Doyle's successor at Fort Massac, Captain Zebulon Pike, placed his immediate subordinate, Lieutenant Aaron Gregg, under arrest, Gregg being charged with seducing the wife of a private soldier and keeping her as a mistress in what Pike called "a scene of Error & Iniquity..."<sup>56</sup> Most notable for his escapades was perhaps Captain Daniel Bissell, who served as commandant at Fort Massac, 1801-1807. Bissell, married and living with his wife at the post, was indicted in 1804 for an attempt on the life of William Chribbs, a merchant at Fort Massac, with whose wife Bissell was enamored. This attempt, planned by Bissell to be executed by one of his soldiers with the connivance of Mrs. Chribbs, consisted of a plan to blow up Chribbs' house with gunpowder!<sup>57</sup> Bissell having escaped criminal conviction, Chribbs brought a civil suit against him for debauching and seduc-

<sup>53</sup> Arthur P. Whitaker, *The Mississippi Question*, New York and London, 1934, 60; Andrew Ellicott, *The Journal of Andrew Ellicott*, Philadelphia, 1803, 80. Lieutenant Pope died disobeying orders. Stationed at Walnut Hills above Natchez in 1799, and ill, he left that post without orders and went to Natchez where he died 12 July, 1799. Cushing to Wilkinson, 22 July, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Sent, 11-12.

<sup>54</sup> General Orders, Baton Rouge, 27 April, 1811, in Post Revolutionary War Records, Volume 150 (cited hereafter as "Orders, Baton Rouge").

<sup>55</sup> Doyle to Wayne, 4 June, 1794; Guion to Wayne, 5 June, 1794; Guion to Wayne, 9 July, 1794, all in HSP. Guion was turned over to the civil authorities under the charges of having rescued "a Certain woman from the hands of the Sheriffs Officers." Wayne to Doyle, 31 January, 1795, HSP.

<sup>56</sup> Pike to Wilkinson, 3 July, 1796; Pike to Wayne, 5 July, 1796; Pike to Wayne, 6 August, 1796, all in HSP.

<sup>57</sup> Plea in Bissell vs. Chribbs, August Term, 1806, quoting United States vs. Bissell *et al.*, 1804, Randolph County (Ill.) Circuit Court, Miscellaneous Papers. The court records indicate that neither Bissell nor Rumsay, the private soldier, were ever produced for trial. Bissell was, however, put under a "peace bond" in 1806 after a jury found him not guilty of the charge. *Ibid.*, dated (?) August, 1806; indictment with true bill and plea, United States vs. Bissell, 1804-1805, *ibid.*

ing his wife, seeking \$3,000 damages.<sup>58</sup> Bissell countered by bringing a civil suit against Chribbs for \$1,500 for damages and expenses he had been put to in defending himself against Chribbs, which defense he alleged had caused him "to undergo great labors as well in body as mind. . . ."<sup>59</sup> Nothing more is heard of these suits. As for Mrs. Chribbs, the French girl who caused all this turmoil, she married a third man in 1809.<sup>60</sup>

Other examples of moral charges against officers could be cited. In 1804 Captain Hugh McCall was tried at Fort Wilkinson "for keeping a miss." The captain's crime was considered serious, not only because he had violated orders forbidding this practice, but also because the "miss" he had chosen had formerly been kept by one of the garrison privates!<sup>61</sup> Another officer was forced to resign his commission after a career which ended in a tavern "in some part of the State of Tennessee, under circumstances highly dishonorable to himself."<sup>62</sup>

The most famous disciplinary case of all, however, was the court-martial of Lt. Col. Thomas Butler, a veteran of the Revolution, who absolutely refused to comply with General Wilkinson's famous order of 29 April, 1801, that the long hair of the earlier days should be cropped on both enlisted and commissioned personnel.<sup>63</sup>

The frontier commandant represented his government to strangers appearing at the post. During the time of the "X.Y.Z." Affair when the western country feared French intrigues and plots, strict orders were issued to post commandants to regulate the privileges of visitors more closely. This resulted from the suspicious tour

<sup>58</sup> The plea alleges that Bissell forcibly entered Chribbs' home and debauched his wife, who thereupon eloped with Bissell and lived in adultery with him for some time. Plea, Chribbs vs. Bissell, 1806; *capias*, Chribbs vs. Bissell, 1805, in *ibid.* The *capias* names the damages sought as \$5,000, the plea as \$3,000.

<sup>59</sup> Plea, Bissell vs. Chribbs, August Term, 1806, *ibid.*

<sup>60</sup> Marriage Certificate of Elizabeth Deny and Drewry Prichard, 2 February, 1809, *ibid.* Elizabeth Deny (Denis) is here described as having been "formerly the Wife of William Chribbs."

<sup>61</sup> General Orders, 30 November, 1804, Wilkinson Order Book, 504-512 (photostat in the hands of the author).

<sup>62</sup> Secretary of War to James Farlie, 10 April, 1807, War Office, Military Book, III, 32. In 1812 a lieutenant who stabbed his captain in Natchez was found guilty and given a reprimand. Orders, Cantonment Washington, 11 September, 1810, n. p.

<sup>63</sup> General Orders, 29 April, 1801, Wilkinson Order Book (Library of Congress), unnumbered pages. This order book should be distinguished from the one in the National Archives cited previously. Future references to it will be designated by "LC". This order was reissued at Wilkinsonville on 29 July, 1801. Wilkinson Order Book, 344. Butler was twice tried for violation of this order and died defying it.

of the western rivers by the French agents Collot and Warren in 1796.<sup>64</sup> In ordinary times, however, the post commandant was only too glad to act as host to a traveller.<sup>65</sup> Blane, the English traveller, remarks that most tavern keepers he met in the western country were militia officers. In this case, he writes, "The landlord, although clothed from top to toe in buckskin, and not remarkably clean, was at least a captain, and generally a major or colonel."<sup>66</sup> The regular army officer at the frontier post, wearing the cloth coat of an officer, was perhaps the better host, for he dispensed a true hospitality and without price.

The officer's table was not to be despised, if we may believe what evidence has been found on the subject. Captain Lukens' larder offered smoked beef, bacon, and venison, with tea and coffee (with sugar) for drinking.<sup>67</sup> When Captain Zebulon Pike, who was stationed at Fort Massac in 1796, was promoted to the majority, he gave a dinner for the post officers at which he served "Elk, Buffeloe, Venison, and wild geese & Ducks and a plenty of White face whiskey."<sup>68</sup> The traveller Ashe sat down at Fort Pickering to "a very sumptuous dinner . . . of fish, venison, squirrels, and bear's meat, with a profusion of wine and desert of Illinois nuts (pecans) . . ." It was one o'clock in the morning when this party broke up, though the author admits that some members of the group had "reposed under the table an hour before. . . ." As proof of his own prowess, he assures us that he was able to descend the one hundred and fifty feet of the stairway, which led down the cliff to the river where his boat was tied, without breaking his neck!<sup>69</sup> Underwood states that the officers at Fort Massac all kept cows and

<sup>64</sup> "Rules and Regulations relative to Maritime and frontier Posts or fortified places," 26 March, 1797, as quoted in Military Book, III, 151-153. See also Victor Collot, "A Journey in North America," *Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society, for the Year 1908*, Springfield, 1908, 269-298; Caldwell, "Fort Massac", 276. An order by Governor St. Clair dated April, 1790, had forbidden civilians to entertain strangers unless these had first been registered with the post commandant. Carter, III, 301.

<sup>65</sup> Only one case has been found in which a traveller was badly received, but in this case the commandant was ill. Dean, "Journal," 322.

<sup>66</sup> Blane, 135.

<sup>67</sup> Lukens Inventory in *loc. cit.*

<sup>68</sup> *Journal, Thomas Taylor Underwood, March 26, 1792 to March 18, 1800*, Cincinnati, 1945, 23.

<sup>69</sup> Thomas Ashe, *Travels in America, Performed in 1806*, London, 1808, 298. Writing in 1799 from Fort Stoddert Captain B. Shamburgh encourages the quartermaster to send him wine and brandy ordered "... as soon as possible, I am quite dry." Shamburgh to Cushing, 20 October, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, 60.



hogs and had gardens. Fish was so plentiful it was used to feed hogs, while various kinds of wild game were supplied by soldier hunters.<sup>70</sup>

In the older settled areas such as Natchez, the commandant might give "a grand entertainment in the town," but such was not within reach of the ordinary post officer, who with less opportunity for show and display, nevertheless gave the stranger "a generous and courteous reception."<sup>71</sup> On the other hand, Cuming found young Zachary Taylor, then stationed at Fort Pickering, capable of offering "civility not unmingled with a small degree of the pompous stiffness of office."<sup>72</sup>

Here and there we get a glimpse of the post commandant as the social leader of the civilian community. Captain Lewis on his way to St. Louis in 1803 found Don Louis Lorimier, the commandant at Cape Girardeau in Louisiana Territory, settling disputes at a horse race, where the commandant's horse had lost "the main race, but won by six inches the by bets. . . ."<sup>73</sup> The commandant at Kaskaskia who arrived in 1805 within a short time promised to be "A most popular commandant, at least with the French Girls . . .," some of whom, our informant suspected, would soon "experience the exuberance of his affection—".<sup>74</sup>

Among the special military assignments held by the commissioned officer was that of "military agent." An act of 1795 had created the office of "Purveyor of Public Supplies" under the Treasury Department. In 1802 there were established three "military agents," who were to purchase and distribute military equipment and supplies. Each military post was provided with an "assistant military agent," who was chosen from the line officers of the post. This office was

<sup>70</sup> *Underwood Journal*, 22, 24, 25. Hunting and fishing were also followed as sports at Massac. Ashe, 280.

<sup>71</sup> "Mr. Ellicot and Lieutenant Pope gave a grand entertainment in the town (Natchez), to which they were kind enough to invite me. . . ." Francis Baily, *Journal of a Tour in Unsettled Parts of North America in 1796 & 1797*, London, 1856, 349. See also Ashe, 281, referring to his reception at Fort Massac and *Bradbury's Travels*, in Reuben G. Thwaites, *Early Western Travels*, V, Cleveland, 1904, 60-61, referring to the author's visit to Fort Osage in 1810. Baily says Captain Pike received him and his party at Fort Massac "with the greatest politeness and attention. . . ." and insisted on their "coming to his table during our stay at this place, which (owing to the weather) was longer than we expected." Baily, *Journal*, 252.

<sup>72</sup> *Cuming's Tour*, in Thwaites, *Early Western Travels*, IV, 294.

<sup>73</sup> Milo M. Quaife, (Ed.), *The Journals of Captain Meriwether Lewis and Sergeant John Ordway, Kept on the Expedition of Exploration, 1803-1806*, Wisconsin Historical Collections, XXII, Madison, 1916, 59. Lorimier held a brevet commission.

<sup>74</sup> Elijah Backus to Jared Mansfield, 5 April, 1805, Carter, VII, 280.



continued until supplanted by the new Purchasing Department and Quartermaster's Department created by an act of 28 March, 1812.<sup>75</sup> In addition to military supplies the military agents handled goods destined for the Indian trade and annuities, though these were generally distributed by the Indian agent.<sup>76</sup> In case of the absence or incapacity of the military agent, his office was performed by the post commandant.<sup>77</sup> It should be noted that the military agents had nothing to do with the procurement and purveyance of food supplies, unless the civilian contractors concerned with this function failed in their duty, or in cases in which civilian contractors were not available. In such cases, the military agents were given the task of providing the rations used by the troops.<sup>78</sup> In extraordinary cases, the military agents purchased locally upon the best terms available, but most of their supplies were sent out from Philadelphia where a central depot was maintained.<sup>79</sup> The military agents were also responsible for the execution of construction projects and in connection with these activities sometimes handled considerable sums of money.<sup>80</sup> Sometimes the assistant military agent handled other

<sup>75</sup> For a sketch of these offices, see Ganoe, *History of United States Army*, 108 and T. F. Rodenbaugh and W. L. Haskin, *The Army of the United States*, New York, 1896, 71. The term "quartermaster" is sometimes used instead of "military agent," especially in reference to larger units. General Orders, Baton Rouge, 9 March, 1811, n. p.

<sup>76</sup> A consignment of stores and supplies destined for Fort Massac in the summer of 1805 and directed to the care of the assistant military agent there consisted of "heavy Gun Carriages and Trunks of Military Clothing & Stationary [sic], Indian Annuities, and Hospital Stores & Medicines . . ." A part of this consignment was sunk at the falls at Louisville. Inspector General to Secretary of War, 10 April, 1806, Inspector's Office, Letters Sent, 12 February, 1805-4 September, 1809, un-numbered pages. Other goods handled by the agents were construction and carpenter's tools, hoes, spades, and tents. See Secretary of War to Amos Stoddard, 19 February, 1803, Carter, VII, 85. Forage, livestock, buildings, and other public property were also under their jurisdiction. A cargo boat going down from Pittsburgh in 1799 not only carried military stores and supplies, but had on board also two young English ladies, who were en route to West Florida to claim the estate of a deceased British officer. Deputy Quartermaster General Isaac Craig to General Wilkinson, 23 May, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, 3-4.

<sup>77</sup> See, for example, Inspector General to Secretary of War, 13 April, 1803, Inspector's Office, Letter Book, 22 February-6 December, 1803, 60; E. P. Gaines to Secretary of War, 19 January, 1807, in Carter, V, 495.

<sup>78</sup> See, for example, General Orders, 7 July, 1805, Wilkinson Order Book, 549.

<sup>79</sup> Secretary of War to Lieutenant William Swan, 17 March, 1809, War Office, Military Book, IV, 49. In such cases the agents were empowered to draw upon the secretary of war in payment for supplies procured, though this practice was strictly regulated. All military agents were bonded and submitted regular reports to the chief agent at Philadelphia.

<sup>80</sup> Thus in 1809 it was estimated that the assistant military agent at Detroit would need for that year \$3,000 for military construction, \$1,600 for

monies such as funds for the Indian service, special expenditures for military movement, or privately for his fellow officers.<sup>81</sup>

The assistant military agent at the frontier post sometimes found himself in difficulties with his superiors. Balancing his accounts might be hindered by the refusal of higher authorities to honor his bills.<sup>82</sup> In one case, the agents concerned seem to have failed to take charge of certain public stores which were left in the care of civilians for a period of years.<sup>83</sup> In 1806 the assistant military agent at Fort Pickering, described as being "notorious as a gambler and tipler," was accused of having "squandered twenty thousand dollars of the public money. . . ." An investigation followed, but the accused died before it was completed!<sup>84</sup> The decision to abolish the system of military agents was made on the ground that there was no adequate way in which the assistant agents could be held strictly responsible to their superiors, who had "no power of influence in their appointment, nor authority to call them to account for mal-practices or neglect of duty."<sup>85</sup>

The assistant military agent was a person of considerable importance in the civilian economy of the frontier community. Along with the military paymaster, he handled most of the money which

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camp equipment, \$300 for contingencies, and \$60 for the hospital. Secretary of War to Peter Gansevoort, Jr., 31 May, 1809, Carter, X, 279. At Fort Massac, one of the smaller military installations, the assistant military agent in 1805 made single expenditures ranging in amounts from \$90 to as high as \$833.19. These sums were acquitted through drafts drawn on the secretary of war. Ensign Hezekiah Johnson, Jr., to Secretary of War, 2, 30 April, 31 May, 1805, War Office, Letters Received, II, 146, 147. For details on military construction, see Major Thomas Cushing to Commanding Officer, Mulberry Vale, 22 September, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Sent, 58; Captain Zebulon Pike to Cushing, 13 October, 1799, *ibid.*, Letters Received, 52-53.

<sup>81</sup> Major T. Cushing to F. Jones, 5 October, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Sent, 60-61, 64; Freeman to Cushing, 28 September, 1799, *ibid.*, Letters Received, 13-15; Garrison Orders, Columbian Spring, 5 January, 4 March, 1808, in Orders, Fort Adams, Post Revolutionary War Records, Volume 149 (cited hereafter as "Orders, Fort Adams").

<sup>82</sup> See Secretary of War to William Linnard, 7 August, 1806, War Office, Military Book, III, 51. In this case the secretary wants to know whether the assistant military agent at Fort Nelson "has been allowed a credit on the receipts of persons, to whom he gave due bills, which have not been paid; and also to what amount."

<sup>83</sup> Governor Holmes of Mississippi Territory reported in 1810 that ammunition and arms purchased at the time of the Burr Conspiracy were at this later date still intrusted to the care of private persons. Holmes to Secretary of War, 7 February, 1810; Holmes to Andrew Marschalk, 13 May, 1810, both in Carter, VI, 45, 66.

<sup>84</sup> Secretary of War to Captain Constant Freeman, 18 August, 1806, War Office, Military Book, III, 55.

<sup>85</sup> Secretary of War to W. B. Giles, 1 January, 1810, ASP, *Mil. Aff.*, I, 256. See also Secretary of War to Morgan Lewis, 8 May, 1812, War Office, Military Book, V, 377-378.

the army put into the economy of the area. He employed civilian workers and his purchases stimulated struggling business enterprises and at times, doubtless, the agricultural economy as well. At the small post, he ranked second to the post commandant and in some cases was the only other commissioned officer.

The office of paymaster general dates from 1775, but the Act of 3 March, 1799, first gave shape to a regular system of deputy and regimental paymasters. The Act of 16 March, 1802, provided for a paymaster of the army, seven paymasters, and two assistants, thus abolishing the posts of regimental and battalion paymasters; however, these were restored in the Act of 12 April, 1808. During the War of 1812 civilians were appointed as regimental paymasters. Paymasters and assistants were bonded in the performance of their duties.<sup>86</sup>

In general, troops in frontier posts were paid twice per year, though the exigencies of the service sometimes prevented this schedule from being carried out. Often troops received no pay for many months.<sup>87</sup> In the years immediately preceding the War of 1812 a fairly regular system of pay was maintained.<sup>88</sup> In cases in which regular pay schedules could not be maintained, authority was given to advance pay to the troops for periods of up to three months.<sup>89</sup> The

<sup>86</sup> Rodenbaugh and Haskin, *United States Army*, 100 ff. The officer's acceptance of a paymaster's office carried personal responsibility for the funds handled. See Captain Z. M. Pike to Cushing, 13 October, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, 47-48.

<sup>87</sup> See "Abstract of pay due to the 2nd Regt. of Infantry (and) one Company & a Detachment of the 2 Regt. Arll. [sic] & Engrs. At Wilkinsonville," 2 August, 1801, Wilkinson Papers, Chicago Historical Society. This roll indicates many of these troops had been irregularly paid. Writing in September, 1796, General Wayne informed Captain Zebulon Pike that no payroll for the garrison at Fort Massac had been received that year. Wayne to Pike, 2 September, 1796, HSP. See also the *Underwood Journal*, 23, 27-28. In 1799 some of the troops at Fort Stoddert had no pay for eight to ten months. Capt. B. Shamburgh to Cushing, 20 October, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, 58. In August of that same year Captain Z. M. Pike at Fort Pickering was still looking for a pay officer who had left in May to get money for the troop's pay. Pike to Cushing, 10 August, 1799, *ibid.*, 36. This condition of delayed pay was general throughout the posts of the southern area in 1799-1800. See Cushing to Wilkinson, 14 August, 1799, *ibid.*, Letters Sent, 24; same to same, 15 February, 1800, *ibid.*, 109-110. The illness of a paymaster was partly to blame for this. In March, 1805, the garrison at St. Louis had not been paid since the previous August. J. Bruff to Wilkinson, 12 March, 1805 (copy), Carter, XIII, 103.

<sup>88</sup> See Ewing to Secretary of Treasury, 18 February, 1812, Carter, VIII, 165. In 1810 a general order in the southern district contemplated keeping the troops paid to within two months of their service time. General Orders, Southern and Western District, 24 August, 1810, in Orders, Cantonment Washington, 11 October, 1810, n. p.

<sup>89</sup> Secretary of War to Paymaster General, 5 May, 1812, War Office, Military Book, V, 369.

post of district paymaster was rated as a full-time military assignment.<sup>90</sup> The paymaster, whatever his rank, rated a military escort.<sup>91</sup>

In the earlier period the paymasters drew their funds directly from general headquarters.<sup>92</sup> After the opening of ports of entry and land offices in the western country, however, the military paymaster might secure funds from Treasury Department collectors or their deputies, or from private banks; this system was in operation at least as early as 1810.<sup>93</sup>

Bank notes were more commonly used in paying the troops than specie, partly because they were more convenient to transport, but also, doubtless, because they were more readily available in the frontier country.<sup>94</sup> One difficulty encountered in making payment was that of finding the proper denominations of paper or specie to pay each soldier the actual amount due him.<sup>95</sup> That the soldier

<sup>90</sup> Secretary of War to Governor Harrison, 11 July, 1811, Carter, VIII, 126.

<sup>91</sup> See Bissell to Secretary of War, 28 May, 1812, Carter, XIV, 551; General Orders, Columbian Spring, 7 March, 1808, in Orders, Fort Adams, n. p.

<sup>92</sup> Thus Underwood was obliged to travel in person to Greenville and Detroit in 1796 and 1797 to secure the funds to pay the troops at Fort Massac. *Journal*, 23, 27-28.

<sup>93</sup> John Brahan to Secretary of Treasury, 20 April, 1810, (citing Secretary of Treasury to Brahan, 21 March [?], 1810), in Carter, VI, 61. See also Secretary of Treasury to Nathaniel Ewing; same to Edmund H. Taylor, 16 July, 1810, both in Carter, VIII, 33-34; same to Ewing, 15 March, 1810; same to Taylor, same date, in *ibid.*, 10. Each transaction had to be authorized previously by the secretary of the treasury. Secretary of Treasury to Ewing, same to Taylor, 29 November, 1810, *ibid.*, 61-62; Ewing to Secretary of Treasury, 2 January, 1811, *ibid.*, 71; Secretary of Treasury to Ewing, same to Taylor, 14 March, 1811, *ibid.*, 114-115; same to Ewing, same to Taylor, 21 August, 1811, both in *ibid.*, 129-130; same to Ewing, 7 December, 1811, *ibid.*, 141; Ewing to Secretary of Treasury, 1 January, 1812, *ibid.*, 158; Secretary of Treasury to Ewing, same to Taylor, 5 March, 1812, *ibid.*, 169-170. Another relationship between the military paymaster and the revenue collector was that the latter sometimes intrusted his funds to the former for transit to places of deposit. See Ewing to Secretary of Treasury, 2 October, 1809, Carter, VII, 674.

<sup>94</sup> Secretary of Treasury to Edmund H. Taylor, 16 July, 1810; same to Nathaniel Ewing, same date, Carter, VIII, 33-34. See also Ewing to Secretary of the Treasury, 1 September, 1810, *ibid.*, 43. Lt. Col. Zebulon M. Pike permitted half of the pay to be delivered in bank notes to the troops at Cantonment Washington near Natchez in July, 1810. He insisted, however, that no injury be done the soldier by this policy and ordered the paymaster to cash in coin any bills presented by the troops. He also forbade discounts on notes so cashed. Regimental Orders, Cantonment Washington, 24 July, 1810, Orders, Cantonment Washington, 10-11.

<sup>95</sup> Ewing to Secretary of Treasury, 18 February, 1812, Carter, VIII, 165. As an illustration of the kinds of funds taken in by the collectors, see, among others, John Johnson to Edward Tiffin, 3 August, 1813, *ibid.*, 269. This letter, reporting an audit of the funds then in the Vincennes office, reveals that of a total of \$13,722.83 on hand only forty dollars was in gold. \$3,663.33 was in silver. The remainder was in notes on the Bank of Columbia, State Bank of North Carolina, Bank of Nashville, Bank



sometimes found himself in possession of bad paper is not surprising, though the period under discussion was not a period of bank failures.<sup>96</sup>

The military paymaster, like the military agent, was an important personage on the frontier. Through his hands passed thousands of dollars each year, money which General Wilkinson said in 1805 was "in truth the only so[urce] of cash to the Country..."<sup>97</sup> The impact of army pay upon the civilian economy was naturally greatly enhanced in war periods when military forces were increased. One Louisiana correspondent suggested in 1815 that the government might recover some of these funds by opening new land areas for sale!<sup>98</sup> Any adequate estimation of the actual economic effect of military pay upon the frontier community, cannot be made, but one can well imagine the effect the payroll at Wilkinsonville in 1801 had on that small community when \$12,821.06 was released at one time.<sup>99</sup>

The Army medical service dates in some form from the Revolutionary War, but was not given a regular organization until the period of the Legion (1792-1796). Under this organization a chief surgeon was established, with a surgeon for each sub-legion and surgeon's mates for each battalion. When the artillery and engineer regiment was created in 1794, it was allowed a surgeon

of Frankfort (Ky.), Bank of Cincinnati, Bank of Virginia, Mechanics' Bank (Baltimore), Pittsburgh Manufacturing Company, Bank of the Potomac, and the Bank of Pennsylvania.

<sup>96</sup> See, for example, a petition of certain Louisiana citizens, former soldiers, who had been paid "in paper of the Banks in N Orleans, which paper is now refused by the receiver of public monies, & they pray Congress to pass a law authorizing purchasers to re-enter their lands & have their monies already paid placed to their credit." Memorial to Congress by Citizens of the Territory (no date, 1815), *ibid.*, VI, 501 ff.; Josiah Meigs to Secretary of Treasury, 9 February, 1815, *ibid.*, 501.

<sup>97</sup> Wilkinson to Secretary of War, 10 December, 1805, Carter, XIII, 298-299. In the same year, Indiana residents blamed their failures to make land payments to the fact that "The Army being moved from our quarter of the Country, all sumed [sic] together has in a manner dried up our resources in the article of cash..." Petition to Congress by Inhabitants of the Territory, 1 October, 1805, *ibid.*, VII, 307-308. See also Petition to Congress by Inhabitants of the Territory, 1 October, 1805, *ibid.*, 314.

<sup>98</sup> "The number of troops which have been in this Territory for many months past, has been the means of throwing a considerable sum of money into circulation..." Lewis Sewall to Josiah Meigs, 8 March, 1815, Carter, VI, 513-514.

<sup>99</sup> This is the largest single payroll of which mention has been found and was exceptional because of the then heavy concentration of troops at that post. The payrolls of Lt. Ambrose Whitlock including all the pay for the upper Louisiana and lower Ohio posts in the period 1810-1812, ranged from as low as \$10,000 to as high as \$23,000 each six months. Ewing to Secretary of Treasury, 1 September, 1810, Carter, VIII, 43.



and four mates. After the reorganization of the army in 1796, each regiment was given one surgeon and two mates. The Act of 16 March, 1802, provided for medical officers to be posted at garrisons and posts and not with corps as previously. In 1810 an order was issued that no detachment should be sent out on movement without a medical officer and necessary supplies.<sup>100</sup> In 1813 a physician and surgeon general was appointed and the first regular scheme of hospitals provided.<sup>101</sup>

Much could be written about the prevalent unhealthiness of the frontier and even of all America in the period under consideration. European travellers were particularly impressed with the incidence of illness and the high death rate among the Americans, one of whom at least blamed this to American medicine.<sup>102</sup> The French scientist Volney found in 1796 fewer than twenty homes free from fevers during a journey of some seven hundred miles into the Ohio Valley.<sup>103</sup> General Wilkinson, traveling down the Cumberland River from Nashville in 1801, writes that for more than a hundred miles he entered no house without encountering "Disease of the Bilious and intermittent character."<sup>104</sup> Richard Lee Mason found the Illinois people in 1819 almost universally suffering from "Bilious fevers in all their various shapes." He says he saw more "pale and deathly-looking faces" in Illinois in two days than he had seen in Philadelphia in two months.<sup>105</sup> As a rule the country grew more

<sup>100</sup> Secretary of War to Wade Hampton, 22 August, 1810, Carter, VI, 102.

<sup>101</sup> Percy M. Ashborn, *A History of the Medical Department of the United States Army*, Boston and New York, 1929, 25 ff.; Rodenbaugh and Haskin, 86-87. See also Wilfred W. Black, "The Army Doctor in the Trans-Mississippi West, 1775-1860," *The Southwestern Social Science Quarterly*, XXIV, No. 2 (September, 1943), 118-128. Black gives a very superficial treatment of the subject.

<sup>102</sup> Cf. Charles Postel (alias Sealsfield), *Die Vereinigte Staaten von Nordamerika*, Stuttgart und Tübingen, 1827, 185. Sealsfield writes: "Die Sterblichkeit ist in Amerika grösser, als in der alten Welt, die Lebensdauer Kuerzer... Viel jedoch auch die aerztliche Behandlung, die die Lebenskraft des Amerikaners oft in seiner Kindheit, ertoetet. Selten hat er in seinem dreissigsten Jahre noch seine Zaehne: Gliederschmerzen, Rheumatismen aller Art, Auszehrungen, sind die haeusigen und gewoehnlichen Nachwehen der verkehrten aerztlichen Behandlung."

<sup>103</sup> C. T. Volney, *View of the Climate and Soil of the United States of America*, London, 1804, 285-286.

<sup>104</sup> Wilkinson to Secretary of War, 10 August, 1801, Wilkinson Papers, Chicago Historical Society.

<sup>105</sup> *Narrative of Richard Lee Mason in the Pioneer West, 1819* (Heartman's Historical Series No. 6, New York, no date), 51. A year later Timothy Flint reported that "a third part" of the people about Vincennes were confined to bed by illness, which prevailed over most of the Wabash country. *Flint's Letters From America*, in R. G. Thwaites, (Ed.), *Early Western Travels*, VI, 287-288.

unhealthy as one travelled west and south of Cincinnati.<sup>106</sup> Worst of all to those not acclimated to it was Lower Louisiana, the climate of which was sometimes regarded with "extreme dread."<sup>107</sup>

What has been said about the health of civilians in the frontier areas applies equally to the health of the troops. Volney, who visited Wayne's troops at Greenville in 1796, found some three hundred of the three hundred and seventy men at that place suffering from the fever.<sup>108</sup> Captain Zebulon Pike, writing from Chickasaw Bluffs in 1799, describes his men as being "very sickly."<sup>109</sup> Morning reports and monthly returns sometimes revealed almost fifty percent of the troops at a station as unfit for duty.<sup>110</sup> No statistics are available on deaths among the troops, though these must have been excessive compared with present day figures.<sup>111</sup> An epidemic among the troops at Wilkinsonville in 1801 killed large numbers, but no account of the exact number of deaths has been preserved.<sup>112</sup> A second

<sup>106</sup> Christian Schultz, *Travels on an Inland Voyage through the States of New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee*, 2 vols., New York, 1810, 28.

<sup>107</sup> Judge Coburn to James Taylor, (date missing), quoted in Taylor to Secretary of State, 8 February, 1807, in Carter, XIV, 91-92. In 1807 the Territorial Legislature of Mississippi was prorogued because of the widespread sickness prevailing. Members of the Legislature to Governor Williams; Williams to Legislature, 24 December, 1807, both in Carter, V, 590-591. Amos Stoddard, however, states that tuberculosis, rheumatism, skin diseases, and kidney and bladder calculi were rarely seen in this area. *Sketches, Historical and Descriptive of Louisiana*, Philadelphia, 1812, 174-175.

<sup>108</sup> Volney, *View of Soil*, 286. Only three of a party of twenty-five with whom Volney travelled from Cincinnati to Detroit escaped the fever. *Ibid.*

<sup>109</sup> Pike to Commanding Officer, Loftus Heights, Mississippi, 22 July, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, 34; Pike to Cushing, 10 August, 1799, *ibid.*, 36. At the same time Captain B. Shamburgh wrote from Fort Stoddert that the sick list was increasing rapidly "... & God knows where it will stop..." Shamburgh to Cushing, 31 August, 1799, *ibid.*, 39-40. Cushing, writing to Wilkinson, said that even oxen brought down the lower Mississippi could not survive. Cushing to Wilkinson, 22 July, 1799, *ibid.*, Letters Sent, 10.

<sup>110</sup> James Bruff to General Wilkinson, 29 September, 1804, enclosure in Wilkinson to Secretary of War, 2 November, 1804, Carter, XIII, 60. The monthly return of the troops at Fort Massac for September, 1794, showed 21 of 59 men sick. In 1809 Wilkinson reported, "246 men were down at one time out of about 500," at Fort Adams. Wilkinson to Secretary of War, 23 July, 1809, as quoted in *The American Register*, XII, (1810), 91.

<sup>111</sup> In 1805 Wilkinson reported only four deaths among five companies stationed on the Lower Missouri River during the period August-October. Wilkinson to Secretary of War, 10 August, 1805; same to same, 29 October, 1805, both in Carter, XIII, 180, 248. When Wilkinson visited the camp early in August he found over fifty men sick.

<sup>112</sup> For an account of this epidemic, see Caldwell, "Cantonment Wilkinsonville," *MID-AMERICA*, XXXI, No. 1, 21 ff.

epidemic, which occurred at an encampment below New Orleans in 1809 was perhaps even more deadly.<sup>113</sup>

So serious was the impact of disease upon the health of the troops that military movements and operations at certain posts were geared to the seasons, and some strategic posts were actually abandoned during the summer and fall months.<sup>114</sup> At a critical time in 1810 when a call had been made from Fort Stoddert for reinforcements to forestall an attack by American civilians on Mobile, the secretary of war refused to send the troops when needed because of the danger to their lives.<sup>115</sup>

American physicians of that period were in considerable part foreigners—Irish and German barber helpers, who had come to America and put up their shingles. Most of these fellows had conveniently "lost" their credentials during the ocean passage. They had one sovereign remedy—calomel—and, according to one observer, if thirty grains didn't help, they gave sixty.<sup>116</sup>

<sup>113</sup> The prevailing diseases in this case were said to have been diarrhoeas, dysenteries, and fevers, to which was added the scurvy and other ills. Men were said to have been able to pull their sound teeth with their fingers, while their mouths and throats were covered with ulcers. *Medical Repository for 1811*, 85, as quoted in Ashborn, *History of Medical Department*, 27. See also Report of Investigating Committee in *American Register*, VII (1810), 95-96. The committee blamed the high incidence of disease among the troops to the general and widespread illness prevailing that year, but pointed out also the low site of the encampment, the poor provisions, the want of medical and hospital care, including failure to segregate the sick, the fatigue of raw recruits who were engaged in heavy labor, the lack of protection against mosquitoes which resulted in loss of sleep, and the unsanitary conditions in the camp. Stoddard reiterates some of these points and adds intemperance to the list. *Sketches*, 171.

<sup>114</sup> When Cuming visited Fort Adams in 1804 (?) he found the place deserted except for a subaltern and one platoon acting as guards. The garrison was at "a pleasant cantonment in the hills towards Pinckneyville, about five miles distant." Cuming, in Thwaites, IV, 329. Cuming was much impressed with the cemetery at Fort Adams. *Ibid.*, 330. Wilkinson said it was "death to the troops" to work them in swampy areas after 1st July. Wilkinson to Governor Claiborne, 10 May, 1803, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, 27-28.

<sup>115</sup> "Did the Season of the year admit, it would be proper that a Detachment should be immediately ordered to march. But... It is well known that the position is unhealthy, the movement should be delayed to as late a period in the Autumn as may be deemed compatible with the object..." Secretary of War to Wade Hampton, 22 August, 1810, Carter, VI, 101.

<sup>116</sup> Postel (Sealsfield), 188. This observer says he once expressed the hope to one of his countrymen who was practising medicine in America that he would not use calomel so often. The doctor answered: "Oh,... diesen muessen meine Bauern wie Schweinfleisch fressen." *Ibid.*, 190. Another authority states that foreign doctors were not well received except in areas peopled by their erstwhile countrymen. Thomas Cooper, *Some Information Respecting America*, London, 1794, 63.

Whether frontier medical men were worse than their fellows eastward is a question difficult to answer. One observer certainly thought that they were. He writes:

Persons who have not visited the Western States cannot have any idea of the general ignorance of the practioners [sic] of medicine. A young man, after an apprenticeship of a year or two in the shop of some ignorant apothecary, or at the most, after a very superficial course of study at some school or college is entitled to cure (or rather kill) all the unhappy Backwoodsmen who may apply to him for advice. . . . Indeed, to become a doctor in the Backwoods, it is only necessary to have a cabin containing fifty or one hundred dollars' worth of drugs, with a board over the door, affirming that this is Dr. M. or N's 'store.'<sup>117</sup>

How easy it was for a stranger to impersonate a physician is revealed by Estwick Evans, who, while travelling in the western country in 1818, frequently ministered to the sick and acquired the title "Doctor." He assures us he did not lose a patient, which fact he attributed more to his use of psychology than of medicine. He writes: "I always told the sick, that in a few days, they would be perfectly well."<sup>118</sup>

On the other hand, the frontier boasted physicians of another kind. The English traveller, Francis Baily, found a physician at New Madrid, who, though he lived in a "miserable tent" and traded and farmed along with his medical practice, was a man of "good education."<sup>119</sup> Charles Bradbury found the post surgeon at Fort Osage, not only a gentleman, but also a scholar, who had compiled a vocabulary of the Osage language.<sup>120</sup>

The army surgeon of the period had no military rank,<sup>121</sup> though he held an appointment subject to ratification by the Senate.<sup>122</sup> He was entitled, however, to many of the privileges and perquisites of officers. His pay, as has been shown above, was comparable to

<sup>117</sup> Blane, 159-160.

<sup>118</sup> Estwick Evans, *A Pedestrious Tour of Four Thousand Miles, Through the Western States and Territories, during the Winter and Spring of 1818* in Thwaites, VIII, 258-259.

<sup>119</sup> Francis Baily, *Journal of a Tour in Unsettled Parts of North America in 1796 & 1797*, London, 1846, 266. The same writer tells of meeting an army surgeon at Louisville, who was "very much of the gentleman." *Ibid.*, 244.

<sup>120</sup> Bradbury's Travels in Thwaites, V, 61.

<sup>121</sup> Secretary of War to General Wade Hampton, 2 March, 1810, War Office, Military Book, IV, 290.

<sup>122</sup> All applicants were supposed to possess "either a Degree of some College or a Certificate from some Medical Society, of their fitness for practice. . . ." In one case, at least, the Senate refused to confirm the appointment of a man who had not met the above requirements. Secretary of War to Governor Harrison, 12 February, 1811, Carter, VIII, 107-108.



that of officers, and he wore a modified officer's uniform.<sup>123</sup> The army surgeon was as conscious of his grade as an officer was of his rank.<sup>124</sup> One case has been found in which a surgeon's mate assumed command of a post upon the death of the only commissioned officer.<sup>125</sup> It is not clear whether any surgeon held a commission concurrently with his medical appointment, but at least one was so recommended.<sup>126</sup> General Wilkinson, who had studied medicine as a young man, while en route to St. Louis to assume the governorship of Louisiana Territory in 1805, acted as surgeon for some of the men, but this was a general's privilege, doubtless.<sup>127</sup>

The military surgeon was obliged to make semi-annual returns to the secretary of war.<sup>128</sup> These reports have not been often preserved in the military records, but those that survive give some valuable information on the medical art of those days.<sup>129</sup> Returns

<sup>123</sup> For the surgeon's uniforms see Secretary of War to General Hampton, 2 March, 1810, War Office, Military Book, IV, 290. For the status of a surgeon's baggage, see Henry Skinner to Secretary of War (received 10 May, 1810), War Office, Military Book, V, 357. Surgeons were entitled to furloughs on the same grounds as officers. Lt. Col. D. Bissell to Secretary of War, 20 January, 1812, Carter, XIV, 508. The estates of deceased surgeons were settled as in the case of officers and soldiers. Nathaniel Ewing to Secretary of the Treasury, 4 June, 1810, Carter, VIII, 23, *re* the estate of Dr. Samuel McKee, deceased. Surgeons were entitled to personal servants or "waiters" as in the case of officers. See Cushing to Lieutenant A. Marschalk, 2 August, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Sent, 19; same to Captain John Wade, 26 November, 1799, *ibid.*, 89. Enlisted personnel were assigned to the surgeon as hospital assistants and were pretty much under his control in this capacity. Garrison Orders, Baton Rouge, 4 March, 5 May, 1811, n. p. Garrison Orders, Cantonment Washington, 30 July, 1810, n. p. In certain cases surgeons and hospital personnel rated special privileges in respect to passes and off-post activities. Garrison Orders, Baton Rouge, 28 March, 1 April, 1811, n. p.

<sup>124</sup> See the case of one Dr. Brown, who having served in the grade of surgeon during General St. Clair's campaign in 1791, felt himself "degraded" in his appointment as surgeon's mate in 1792, and resigned. Acting Governor Sargent to Secretary of War, 9 June, 1792, Carter, II, 399.

<sup>125</sup> See J. V. Stewart to Secretary of War, 3 August, 1808, War Office, Letters Sent and Received, 1805-1811, Box 14. The writer, stationed at Fort Pickering, signed "J. V. Stewart, Surgeon's M. ComG." The surgeon was normally subject to such post duties and stations "as the Commanding Officer shall designate." Secretary of War to Dr. John M. Daniel, 28 March, 1810, War Office, Military Book, IV, 308.

<sup>126</sup> Acting Governor Sargent to Secretary of War, 9 June, 1792, Carter, II, 399. Sargent said it would be good economy "to indulge this Deviation of common Rule..." especially at smaller posts.

<sup>127</sup> Wilkinson to Secretary of War, 16 May, 1805, Carter, XIII, 127.

<sup>128</sup> See Francis Le Baron to Secretary of War, 20 March, 1809, Carter, X, 271. Here Le Baron excuses himself for failing to file his report. He also asks for a promotion and mentions that he had been appointed "one of the Judges of the Courts for this District which I have accepted of, presuming of your approbation..."

<sup>129</sup> The semi-annual reports did little more than to name personnel on the sick list for the period, with diseases diagnosed in each case. See for example, "Report of the Sick at Fort Massac 31st July, 1794," HSP.



of medicine and hospital stores are more useful in studying the tools and stock-in-trade of the surgeon. Here follows a return made at Fort Massac on 1 August, 1800:

*Return of Medicine and Hospital Stores  
at Fort Massac, 1 August, 1800*

5 lbs. allspice	14 gals. port wine
25 lbs. barley	31 gals. Sherry wine
30 lbs. coffee	14 gals. molasses
24 lbs. chocolate	11 kegs "No. 1 and No. 2" medicine assorted
20 bottles mustard	2 sets amputating instruments
3 lbs. pepper	2 sets trepanning instruments
8 lbs. raisins	1 set tooth instruments
80 lbs. rice	1 set dissecting instruments
6 lbs. loaf sugar	1 set pocket dissecting instruments
106 lbs. brown sugar	3 sets lancets (thumb)
1 gal. lime juice	1 set lancets (spring)
15 lbs. Bohea tea	Incomplete instruments
37 gals. brandy	1 set pocket (dissecting instruments?)
37 gals. vinegar	1 set tooth instruments
	1 set lancets <sup>130</sup>

The tragedy of medical practice in that time was found in the mistaken concepts of the causes of disease even more than in the inadequate treatments given after diseases were contracted. A common belief, for example, was that sleeping in "open air exposed either to the dews or the sun" would infallibly cause disease.<sup>131</sup> Another belief was that stagnant water was "drawn into the atmosphere in a state sufficient to impregnate it with foetid smells and fatal poisons."<sup>132</sup> Related to this belief was the one that rotting wood brought on disease. One surgeon talked of the deadly effect of "the Mass of damp and mouldering Timber" in the barracks at Bellefontaine, saying that the floors of the barracks had sunk into the ground, producing "an unwholesome Effluvia," which he blamed for "the

<sup>130</sup> Photostat in the hands of the author. It should be noted that both molasses and vinegar were then thought to have medicinal qualities.

<sup>131</sup> General Orders, 9 August, 1798, in General Orders, General James Wilkinson, 1797-1808, (L. C.), 127-128. See also Cushing to Commanding Officer, Loftus Heights, 1 August, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Sent, 17-18. In 1811 men were forbidden to swim during sunny hours at Baton Rouge because it was the surgeon's opinion... "That bathing in the heat of the day is injurious to the health of the troops..." Garrison Orders, Baton Rouge, 11 May, 1811, n. p.

<sup>132</sup> Ashe, 279-280. Another writer speaks of "noxious and foetid Exhalations" as coming from stagnant water. A. Saugrain to D. Bissell, 16 June, 1809, Carter, XIV, 276-279.

late Mortality" at that place.<sup>133</sup> Another writer advised against sending fresh troops to Fort Clark unless new quarters were provided, for, he warned, "They will take sick as fast as they arrive, if they live in such miserable huts as are at present in the Garrison."<sup>134</sup>

Despite these fallacies in opinion as to the causes of disease, some constructive measures were adopted by the army in the period under consideration. In 1801 the secretary of war sought the best medical opinion as to "the kinds and proportions of medicines necessary for each post."<sup>135</sup> General Wilkinson, despite his shady reputation in the western country, was interested in medicine and health. He attempted to enforce simple sanitary rules in the camps and cantonments.<sup>136</sup> Mosquito netting was beginning to be used, though the relation of mosquitoes to the summer fevers and agues had, of course, not been suspected.<sup>137</sup> Ashe relates how the health of Fort Massac was improved by draining the swamps to the rear of the fort and by the introduction of sanitary rules among the men. The consumption of whiskey was also limited.<sup>138</sup> Volney also refers to the improvement of health through the removal of stagnant water bodies near dwelling places.<sup>139</sup>

<sup>133</sup> A. Saugrain to D. Bissell, 16 June, 1809, *loc. cit.* See also Bissell to Secretary of War, same date, *loc. cit.* Amos Stoddard, 174, referring to illness among the troops at Columbian Spring in 1807, explains that, though this post was on high ground, the troops lodged there had lately been to lower sites and had "their systems gorged with a complication of animal, vegetable, and other noxious effluvia, which predisposed them to the attacks of violent disorders."

<sup>134</sup> Thomas Forsyth to Benjamin Howard, 6 July, 1814, inclosure in Howard to Secretary of War, 15 July, 1814, Carter, XVI, 444-447.

<sup>135</sup> Secretary of War to Dr. Benjamin Rush, 28 April, 1801, War Office, Military Book, 1800-1803, 115-116; same to Israel Whelen, 17 February, 1802, *ibid.*, 264.

<sup>136</sup> General Orders, 9 October, 1798, Wilkinson Order Book, 155. Occasional post or garrison orders give attention to elementary sanitary rules about the post such as the digging of latrines and their use and the use of flowing water to wash away filth. Garrison Orders, Baton Rouge, 10 March, 1811; Garrison Orders, Fort Dearborn (not Chicago), 8 July, 1808, in Orders, Fort Adams, n. p.; Garrison Orders, Columbian Spring, 17 April, 1808, *ibid.*

<sup>137</sup> Captain Lukens had a mosquito bar about his bed at Wilkinsonville. Lukens Inventory. Latrobe has a good discussion on the mosquitoes at New Orleans in 1819. *Journal*, 232ff. Baily tells of the use of "mosquito bar," which he says the New Orleans people called "mosquito bear." *Journal*, 309.

<sup>138</sup> Ashe, *Travels*, 279-280.

<sup>139</sup> "I have likewise known two instances, where drying up a small pond and a mill-stream radically delivered two families from the annual visitation of autumnal fever." Volney, *View*, 289. He refers also to the improvement of soldiers' health in Corsica through such measures. *Ibid.*, 289-292. Volney, however, still had faith in the "bitters" (a concoction consisting mostly of brandy, rum, and Madeira wine) as a specific against fevers. *Ibid.*, 288-289.

The medical authorities often failed miserably to provide for the care of the troops. In 1799 medical supplies destined for the posts of the lower Mississippi were ordered deposited at Fort Massac and many weeks elapsed before these supplies were distributed, during which time many posts were completely without medical supplies.<sup>140</sup> Posts are found at that time without surgeons and one post had a surgeon who had no instruments!<sup>141</sup> Transfers of clothing and other supplies gave some relief to this situation by the end of the year.<sup>142</sup>

The surgeons themselves were not beyond criticism. At Fort Sargent the surgeon was alleged to have turned a hospital room over to local citizens for use as a dance hall, while the request of the territorial authorities to use the room for holding a court was refused!<sup>143</sup> Colonel John Francis Hamtramck in the same year sent out an inquiry concerning a surgeon at Fort Massac named Pendergrast, wanting to know . . . *"what induced him to sell a horse that had been lent him, & what he has done with the money. . ."* Pendergrast was later tried for his offense, this leaving Fort Massac without a surgeon.<sup>144</sup> Another surgeon died accidentally, ". . . by a fall on a bottle full of Rum, which he carried in his pocket. . ."<sup>145</sup>

Little has been found concerning the care of the sick. Men reported "sick" weren't always ill, since it was the custom to return raw recruits as "sick" during the first month of service so that they might receive special drill and instruction. Officers were detailed daily at some posts for drilling such soldiers.<sup>146</sup> Men sent to the

<sup>140</sup> Cushing to Captain I. Pasteur, 15 July, 1799; Cushing to Wilkinson, 14 August, 1799; same to same, 15 February, 1800, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Sent, 3-4, 22, 112-113; Pasteur to Cushing, 12 August, 1799, *ibid.*, Letters Received, 37; Captain B. Shamburgh to Cushing, 19 July, 1799, *ibid.*, 22-24.

<sup>141</sup> Pasteur to Cushing, 12 August, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, 37. Captain B. Shamburgh wrote at this time from Fort Stoddert to the effect that, though he had a surgeon at that post, there were no instruments for him to use. Should a limb have to be amputated, Shamburgh said, it would have to be chopped off with a broad-axe! Shamburgh to Cushing, 19 July, 1799, *ibid.*, 24.

<sup>142</sup> Cushing to Dr. Carmichael, 20 November, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Sent, 84.

<sup>143</sup> Cushing to Carmichael, 31 January, 1800, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Sent, 97-98; Cushing to Captain John Wade, same date, *ibid.*, 95-96.

<sup>144</sup> Pasteur to Cushing, 29 November, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, 68-69; same to same, 28 July, 1799, *ibid.*, 11; Cushing to Pasteur, 11 October, 1799, *ibid.*, Letters Sent, 68. The results of this trial have not been found.

<sup>145</sup> Shamburgh to Cushing, 1 December, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Received, 71.

<sup>146</sup> See, among others, Garrison Orders, Baton Rouge 4, 16 March, 1811, n. p.

hospital returned their arms and equipment to the company, while their clothing and personal effects were placed in charge of the medical personnel.<sup>147</sup> Those able to walk treated their own sores before the orderly sergeant.<sup>148</sup> Persons on sick lists could be discharged only by approval of the surgeon.<sup>149</sup> Reviewing officers of courts-martial decisions often remitted or modified penalties imposed on sick or ailing men.<sup>150</sup> Men sometimes feigned illness to cover up drunkenness, this practice being frequently referred to in post records.<sup>151</sup> Soldiers who were disabled or unfit for service were not forced out of the army, and many doubtless remained on the rolls, even when qualified for a small pension.<sup>152</sup>

The medical facilities of the army were sometimes used for treating the civil population about the military post.<sup>153</sup> On the other hand, civilian doctors might be called upon to minister to the soldiers.<sup>154</sup>

The military surgeon was undoubtedly a person of considerable prestige at the frontier post and in the adjoining civilian community. Though not a commissioned officer, he stood next to him in the military hierarchy. Then, as now, the medical man doubtless was a leading figure in society.

NORMAN W. CALDWELL

Southern Illinois University

<sup>147</sup> Garrison Orders, Baton Rouge, 28 March, 1811, n. p.

<sup>148</sup> Company Orders, Baton Rouge, 25 March, 1811, n. p.

<sup>149</sup> General Orders, Headquarters, Washington, D. C., 12 July, 1808, in Orders, Fort Adams, no date, n. p.

<sup>150</sup> Orders, Baton Rouge, 10 March, 1811, n. p.; Orders, Cantonment Washington, 5 October, 1810, n. p.

<sup>151</sup> See Garrison Orders, Cantonment Washington, 18 August, 7, 18 October, 1810, n. p. The surgeon or the commandant was to examine men in such cases.

<sup>152</sup> Garrison Orders, Baton Rouge, 2, 9 April, 1811, n. p. Colonel Z. M. Pike said it was not the intent of the government "to throw on the world, poor disabled without thier [sic] being in a condition to obtain thier [sic] bread." See also Cushing to Lieutenant A. Marschalk, 8 November, 1799, Cushing Letter Book, Letters Sent, 82-83.

<sup>153</sup> "I have directed the Surgeons mate at Chicasaw Bluffs, immediately to make up and forward to you a small invoice of medicine for the relief of our unfortunate fellow citizens. . . ." Secretary of War to S. Mitchell, 12 October, 1803, War Office, Military Book, 10 November, 1800-17 November, 1803, 543. Dr. Francis Le Baron, post surgeon at Mackinac, says he had "made Use of public Medicine" in treating white civilians and Indians about that post. He charged no fees for this service. Le Baron to Secretary of War, 30 September, 1810, Carter, X, 329.

<sup>154</sup> General Orders, 1 February, 1798, Wilkinson Order Book, 106. In such cases the physician was paid at the same rate as a military surgeon. See Secretary of War to W. W. Bibb, (no date), refusing to allow a higher bill which Bibb had submitted for such service. War Office, Military Book, III, 411.